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Abstract
This dissertation presents a prototype model and methodology for validating a simple
agent-based model against the basic Hotelling monopoly model and a few basic extensions.
Hotelling's Rule identies the expected behavior of a market for a nonrenewable resource.
The statement is simple - marginal prot will increase at the prevailing rate of interest - but
the implications are far-reaching and not broadly understood.

Agent-based modeling is a

computer modeling and simulation methodology. It has its origins in biology and physics,
but has become a powerful tool in the social sciences for examining systems in which the
well-understood behaviors of individuals result in unanticipated outcomes.

Validation of the basic Hotelling monopoly model is a necessary step in wider acceptance
of agent-based modeling as a predictive and analytical tool in natural resource economics.
An agent-based model is a valid predictive tool if, given rules to express preferences, it is
possible to predict the large-scale outcomes of the choices made by individuals over time. An

vii

agent-based model is a valid analytical tool if it provides a means to explore the behaviors
that lead to known results, much like nonlinear regression.
This simple agent-based model is found to be valid for the basic Hotelling monopoly
model. The agent-based model is validated with caveats for the Hotelling monopoly model
with extensions to include basic production technologies. The caveats are based on small
deviations, the magnitudes of which depend on the specic form of costs associated with a
production technology. It is argued that those deviations are not unlike the deviations that
a human would make.
An extension of the Hotelling monopoly model to a small oligopoly exhibits emergent
cooperation-like properties, despite the absence of explicit interagent communication. Depending on the number of producers and the initial distribution of resource stocks, the
behavior is either collusion-like or Cournot-like.

The Cournot-like outcome occurs when

only some of the producers lower production, resulting in a rise in the market price, which
causes the other producers to experience a Hotelling's Rule increase in marginal prot without reducing their own production.

This continues at each time step, so that the latter

producers maintain a constant, higher production level while the others continue to decrease
production.
The outcomes of the agent-based models are reassessed with the costs previously arising
from production technologies replaced by taxes associated with scal policies. Each scal
regime is evaluated in terms of its ecacy and the unintended consequences of the policy. The
policy goals examined are preservation for future generations, internalization of externalities
(Pigouvian taxation), and revenue generation. This comparison uses data from the agentbased models, examining agent error as one of the unintended consequences of scal policy.
The basics of agent-based modeling are presented. This methodology is suited to problems in which the immediate preferences of the agents can be stated as equations or rules
but complexity in their interactions with the environment or each other make predicting the
outcomes dicult.
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Glossary

Abbreviations and specialized terms
ABM

Agent-based model or agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling is a technique for making models - primarily computer models - in which the individual agent (e.g. people, rms, countries) are represented in terms of their
state (wealth, for example) and behaviors (buy more stu, for example).
The initials ABM are also used in reference to an agent-based model. The
ambiguity in usage is usually resolved by context, but in this dissertation,
the initials ABM are used only to refer to a model.

Agent

An agent is an actor in an ABM. It could be an individual, a rm, a country,
or an aggregation of other agents (Epstein and Axtell (1996, p. 4)).

Artifact

The Random House Dictionary denes artifact as a spurious observation or
result arising from preparatory or investigative procedures.

1

In the context

of modeling and simulation, an artifact is typically an outcome that is the
result of the way the simulation was done rather than a characteristic of the
underlying model.

Emergent

An emergent behavior is one that arises from the the interactions or aggregate behavior of agents.

It is not programmed into the model and often

1 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/artifact

(accessed 20 April 20100).

Glossary

xviii

comes as a surprise to the modeler.

Emergence refers to the presence of

one or more emergent properties, or to the capability to produce emergent
properties. The term appears throughout the literature on complexity, see
Epstein and Axtell (1996, p. 33) for example.

Monte Carlo

This is the city in Monaco famous for its casino. The term is used to refer to
a technique for solving numerical problems for which an exact computation
either does not exist or is computationally expensive (Meteopolis and Ulam,
1949). The problematic calculation is replaced with a stochastic representation of its solution space. This latter step typically involves distribution

sampling, a term with which Monte Carlo sampling is sometimes confused
(Hendry, 1984).

A simulation of an agent-based model in which certain

variables are sampled from distributions is a Monte Carlo sample.

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

They're more what you'd call guidelines than actual rules.
-Hector Barbosa in Pirates of the Caribbean:

The Curse of the Black Pearl

With regard to Hotelling's Rule, Captain Barbosa might well have said it's more what you'd
call an outcome than an actual rule.

Hotelling (1931) observes that the owner of a nite

natural resource is indierent to either exploiting it or leaving it in situ unless the marginal
prot increases at the prevailing interest rate. The rationale is that, if the return is lower
than this, the resource owner will shift assets to a better performing investment.

If the

return is greater, the owner will leave the resource where it is as it appreciates faster than
the prevailing interest rate. In other words, the resource will not be produced at all unless
it can be produced at a rate that returns the prevailing interest rate.
Hotelling noted that this sets the upper limit on a monopoly producer's prot from
production. To explain this, it is necessary to appeal to the law of demand. For a downwardsloping demand curve, the monopoly producer can only increase the price by decreasing the
production level. Hotelling's Rule says that if the producer decreases production at a rate
that makes the marginal prot change by the interest rate, total prot from the resource will

Chapter 1.
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2

be maximized. If the production level is changed in any other way, total prot will be less
than the maximum.
Hotelling's Rule is often called the r-percent rule and paraphrased as the price must
increase by r percent, r referring to the interest rate.

1

The producer prot, or scarcity rent,

is paid by the consumer, and is also called user cost. If prot is increasing by r-percent, then
user cost is also increasing by r-percent. Using dynamic optimization, Hotelling shows that
the r-percent rule is the outcome of the producer maximizing prot, rather than a rule for
the producer to follow.
The responsibility for naming it a rule may fall on Robert Solow, who rst used the term
Hotelling's rule in his Ely Lecture presented to the 1973 conference of the American Economic Association (Solow, 1974, p 12). In reference to this, Solow reects that Hotelling's
concept is not a 'rule' at all in the appropriate sense. It doesn't enjoin anything. Phelps's
Golden Rule is and does. Hotelling's principle is a description of what a foresighted competitive market would do, under simple conditions. Neither Phelps's nor Hartwick's rule has
that property. They have to be imposed.

2

Nonetheless, the term Hotelling's Rule appears

in countless texts and papers and is well-known - even beloved - to generations of natural
resource economists.
Hotelling's observation applies to the conditions imposed on the original model: a producer of an exhaustible resource with perfect information and a costless technology. Hotelling's
primary goal was to illustrate how dynamic equilibrium produces a result that is not evident
using the conventional (at that time) methods of static equilibrium. Hotelling's methodology
has stood the test of time, although calculus of variations, to which Hotelling appeals for
dynamic optimization, has since been supplanted by optimal control theory.
This dissertation has three objectives: to establish a framework for validation of an agentbased modeling approach to nonrenewable resource production planning and analysis; to use

1 Strictly
2 From

speaking, price is not identical to marginal prot, particularly in a monopoly market.
a personal communication dated 25 May 2010.
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this framework to validate a simple optimizing agent-based model (ABM); and to explore
any new aspects of the problem that are brought to light by agent-based modeling.
The ABM developed specically for the Hotelling monopoly model is extremely simple.
It will be shown that, when incorporating highly stylized production technologies, the same
ABM makes slight deviates from the optimal production. These deviations result in total
prots that are less than optimal by from less than one percent to up to ten percent, depending on how the technology comes into the cost equation. I argue that the errors

3

made

by the agent in the model are similar to the errors that a human would make in the face of
uncertainties in demand or resource extent. That argument, however, is based on elementary
principles of agent-based modeling, which will be introduced and discussed in Chapter 3.
The ABM will also be extended to an oligopoly market where it will be shown that,
despite the absence of communication between the agents, the production paths mimic either
collusive or Cournot equilibrium depending on initial conditions. Finally, the results from the
ABM simulations are re-examined as stylized scal policies. The eciencies and unintended
consequences of the policies are discussed in conjunction with the kinds of errors made by
the ABM.
The preceding points are presented in greater detail in the following sections. The overarching idea is that, much as Hotelling's Rule sets the upper limit on a producer's prot, this
simple ABM presents the worst that an optimizing producer might do. Certainly a more sophisticated ABM - or a human - could make better production path decisions. The intent of

3 The

term error is used throughout the following discussion of the ABM results. This is not

error in the econometric sense, but an ABM production decision that deviates from the Hotelling's
Rule optimum production path. Since the Hotelling's Rule production path results in the maximum
possible total prot, the eect of that deviation can be measured in terms of the resulting shortfall
in total prot. Quantitative error, then, is that shortfall as a percentage of the Hotelling's Rule
optimal total prot. Because the decision rules applied by the ABM are intended to mimic a human
decision process (however naive), the term error also reinforces that parallel without being overly
anthropomorphic.
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agent-based modeling is to have the software agents make decisions using the same information and rules that are available to a human. Agent-based modeling, however, requires much
less time and expense than experiments with humans and allows sampling of a much larger
parameter space than is available through data collection. Agent-based modeling presents
the possibility of exploring dozens of production technologies, to consider uncertain and possibly changing resource extents, and to incorporate stochastic uncertainties in demand and
interest rates. In addition to what-if analysis for production planning, agent-based modeling
provides a laboratory for testing theories for why resource producers follow production paths
that appear to deviate from Hotelling's Rule. It is hoped that, by validating the approach,
this dissertation sets the stage for these and other uses of agent-based modeling in resource
economics.

1.1 The inverse demand function and its parameters
All of the ABMs in this dissertation use the inverse demand function introduced by
Hotelling (1931, sec. 4) for a monopoly producer. The details are presented in Section 3.2.
Similarly, the parameter values for all simulations in this dissertation are from Section 3.2.

1.2 A simple ABM and Hotelling's outcome
The background and theory of Hotelling's Rule are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. The basic model is of a monopoly producer of a nonrenewable resource. The producer
employs a technology that is costless, or for which the cost is absorbed in the price. That
is, the technology imposes no costs that are dependent on time, the production level, or the
amount of remaining stock. Hotelling's Rule states that if the producer is maximizing total
prot, the marginal prot will increase at the interest rate. For a normal demand function,
that means decreasing production each period at a rate that causes the percent change in
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marginal prot to equal the interest rate. Given a specic demand function and a nal state
of stock depletion, this determines the production path. The initial stock level is the only
additional information needed to determine the initial production level.

The process described above is straightforward, given knowledge of the demand function. If the demand function is dierentiable and the constraint equation is integrable, the
production path can be expressed in closed form. Otherwise, the production path will be
expressed as a summation or, in the case that the demand function is not dierentiable, as
a complicated numerical expression. In any case, the optimal production path is explicit.

For the ABM, the production path is determined heuristically.

An overview of agent-

based modeling is given in Section 2.3, but for the moment, think of an agent as a robot or
android. That is, an actor that can only do what it is told. In the monopoly ABM, there is
a single producer agent, and this agent is given one task: extract a nonrenewable resource at
a rate that maximizes total prot over the lifetime of the resource. The details of the agent's
behaviors are discussed in Chapter 4 and can be summarized by noting that the agent uses
basic arithmetic to decide whether to increase, decrease or maintain the current production
level based on estimated total prot. This decision is made in each production period (days)
and amounts to Bayesian updating.

At the beginning of each simulation, there is a short period during which the producer
agent searches for the optimal starting production level. On average, the search takes approximately ten time-steps. For comparison, the most basic model in this dissertation completes
in 1958 time-steps. Once the producer agent nds the optimal production level, it begins
adjusting production to maximize total prot. Aside from the brief period at the beginning,
the production path is very similar to the optimal (Hotelling's Rule) production path, being
about one percent too high at the initial downturn, and ending a fraction of a percent too
soon. This error is illustrated in Figure 1.1 with the error greatly exaggerated.

Total prot for the ABM is a fraction of one percent lower than the optimal production
path. However, the ABM's percent change in marginal prot is nearly fteen percent higher
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Figure 1.1: An example of the initial production level error.
The heavy black line is the Hotelling's Rule optimum production path.

The thinner red

line is the production path as determined by the ABM. At the beginning, the agent starts
increasing production by
production path.

∆q .

In this example, the heavy line is the Hotelling's Rule optimal

The production level after the rst increment is too low, and after the

second increment it is also too low, but after the third increment, the production level is too
high. At this point, the agent begins a constant downward production path but, because
the initial production level is above the optimum, the stock is depleted more quickly than
optimal, and the stock is depleted sooner than the Hotelling's Rule optimum.

than the r-percent rule. It will be shown that, although this diers from Hotelling's Rule,
the consequences are very small.

The preceding results, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, are the rst step in demonstrating
the utility of agent-based modeling in natural resource economics. In addition, the results
also show that, although the r-percent rule is optimal, production paths can dier from the
r-percent rule and still produce nearly optimal total prot. The low sensitivity to deviations
from the r-percent rule has important implications for studies in actual resource markets.

The ABM in these models is intentionally simplistic. However, real producers may only
have a general idea of the demand function they face, have sparse and out-of-date information
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on competitors or product substitutes, and contend with a multitude of other unknown or
uncertain factors. It is possible that these producers would use crude approximations not
unlike this one.

This dissertation focuses entirely on Hotelling's monopoly model (Hotelling, 1931, sec.
4), in which the rate-of-change of marginal prot is endogenous. In the competitive model
(Hotelling, 1931, sec. 2), the corresponding price rate-of-change is imposed exogenously. In
the latter case, Hotelling shows that resource owners would either divest themselves when
price change is less than the interest rate, or forestall production when price change is greater
than the interest rate. By establishing the use of agent-based modeling for the monopoly
Hotelling model, the framework in this dissertation serves as starting point for developing a
model that endogenizes the price mechanism of a competitive market.

1.3 The ABM and production technologies
Production technologies come into dynamic optimization problems in the form of costs.
The production model in Section 1.2 employs a costless production technology. That is, there
are no costs that depend on time, production level, or stock. Real production technologies
may have costs associated with all three, often in combination. For example, there may be
lease costs that aect the optimal production path. Most production technologies have costs
that depend on the production level, and these costs may be polynomial or exponential in
the production level. In most resources there are also stock-dependent costs. These are costs
associated with extraction becoming more expensive, such as the deepening of a mine or
decreasing pressure in a well. Another source of stock cost is the tendency to exploit higher
grade ore rst, causing the yield to decrease as the stock is depleted.

For simplicity, this ABM assumes that costs are separable and examines each one individually. To the extent that separability holds, the eect of a technology which imposes
costs from more than one regime is likely to be a superposition. Nonseparable costs are not
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considered in these models.

The following sections summarize the behavior of this ABM in each cost regime.

In

brief, the extent to which the ABM producer deviates from the optimal production path
varies with cost structure. For error measured in terms of deviation from optimal, the ABM
producer is unaected by a xed cost.

Under a marginal cost, the ABM producer makes

a small error that increases to about eight percent with cost level. With a stock cost the
error is as high as ten percent and depends on whether any stock will be left unproduced.
In the marginal cost and stock cost models, it is argued that part of the error is an artifact
of the simulation, and part represents an issue also faced by a human production planner.
That is, a small error in estimating future price leads to a small production path error early
on, with ramications over the lifetime of the resource.

The ABM in this case can make

daily adjustments to the production level, making up, partially, for earlier errors. A human
production planner may not have such exibility.

1.3.1 Lease and capital costs

Extractive industries tend to require large capital investments, and capital can be regarded as a quasi-xed cost (Young, 1992). A lease incurs a xed cost irrespective of the
amount of resource extracted.

Intuitively, a xed cost provides an incentive to accelerate

depletion of the resource stock in order to reduce total cost, and Section 3.4 shows that this
is what is expected theoretically.

In terms of total prot, the simulation result from the

monopoly ABM is indistinguishable from the theoretical result. This is not surprising, since,
theoretically, the optimum is a straight line descending production path with the same slope
as the costless model.
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1.3.2 Marginal costs
Extractive technologies, like most production technologies, incur costs that are proportional to the level of production. Scott (1967) uses a quarrying example to illustrate that
economy of scale considerations at low levels of production, and problems of marketing,
delivery and storage at high levels of production, lead to a U-shaped marginal cost curve.
Cobb-Douglas models in which production level appears are found in econometric models
of nickel (Stollery, 1983) and copper (Young, 1992), for example. For simplicity, marginal
cost is linear in production level for the monopoly ABM model with marginal cost. Because
the ABM producer overshoots the optimal initial production level, as explained in Section
1.2, there is also an error in the marginal cost model. In this model, however, the size of
the error increases with increasing cost. The eect is linear and proportional to the cost,
amounting to an error in total prot from zero, at zero cost, to eight percent at the high end
of the range of costs simulated. In all cases the agent picks in initial production level that is
too high, resulting in the resource being depleted in less time than optimal.

1.3.3 Stock and cumulative production costs
Costs that depend on the stock level are typically costs related to the cumulative production. Lecomber (1979, p 54) sites the examples of decreasing pressure over the lifetime
of an oil well, increased transportation costs as a mine becomes deeper, and a reduction
in yield as the quality of ore decreases.

4

Like marginal cost models, stock cost models are

often quadratic or in Cobb-Douglas form (Young, 1992). For simplicity, stock cost is linear
in stock level for the monopoly ABM model with stock cost. The eect is similar to that in
the marginal cost model: in the cases where the stock is completely depleted, the ABM producer selects a production path that is higher than optimum, therefore depleting the stock
sooner than optimal. However, with the increasing stock cost arises the possibility that at

4 Slade

(1984) also points out that yield in copper mining depends on price: when the price is

high, more expensive processing is used, which increases the yield.

Chapter 1.

Introduction

10

some time before the stock is depleted, cost exceeds revenue, and marginal prot becomes
negative.

This is the critical stock cost - the stock cost below which the resource will be

physically depleted, and above which production will cease before the stock is physically
depleted. When marginal prot becomes negative, the simulation terminates, leaving up to
sixty percent of the stock unproduced for the highest stock cost simulated.

The range of

stock costs simulated is chosen so that the critical stock cost is approximately mid-range.

Like the marginal cost model, deviation from the optimal production path increases as
stock cost increases. Unlike the marginal cost model, however, the deviation is not linear with
cost and actually improves as stock cost approaches the critical stock cost. The total prot
for the ABM is approximately equal to the theoretical optimum at the critical stock cost,
and diers by about ten percent at about half of the critical stock cost. ABM performance
again begins to fall below the theoretical optimum at costs above the critical stock cost.

The performance of the ABM at costs below the critical stock cost is related the coarseness
of the production change strategy. The straight line decreasing production path optimizes
total prot for zero cost, but is too steep for non-zero stock cost, with the error increasing as
stock cost increases. At about one-half of the critical stock cost, the ABM producer begins
switching to a level production path, which is too level at that stock cost, but as the optimal
production path continues to level o, moving closer to the level ABM production path until
the critical stock cost is reached.

Above the critical stock cost, the range over which the production level yields nonnegative marginal prot narrows as the stock cost increases.

The narrowing of the range

increases the liklihood that an error in the production level will result in negative marginal
prot, triggering termination of the simulation. As a result, production ceases earlier than
optimal, and this error increases with increasing stock cost.

Overall, then, the performance of the ABM worsens as stock cost increases from zero,
then improves as stock cost reaches critical stock cost, then worsens again as stock increases
above critical cost.
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Like the marginal cost model, the errors in the stock cost model are due to the initial
production being too high, for the reasons given in Section 1.2. For the stock cost model,
that error increases with increasing stock cost only to the point when the heuristic begins
choosing the at production path.

Then, as the stock cost increases, the error decreases

until the stock cost reaches the critical stock cost. At the critical stock cost, the optimal
production path would be at, so there is very little error in the production path chosen by
the heuristic. Above the critical stock cost, the error in the initial production level results
in production levels that reach negative marginal prot too soon, with this error increasing
as stock cost increases.

1.4 The ABM in an oligopoly market
The oligopoly ABM is the monopoly ABM with more than one producer.
some important implications.

This has

The producers don't interact directly, aecting each other

only through the market price, which is based on total production. Having no information
about the other producers, each producer estimates the marginal price assuming a monopoly
market. This is intended to a) keep the ABM as simple as possible, and b) illustrate a worst
case outcome. That is, any real-world producer will know if there are competitors, but a
real-world producer is likely to make some erroneous assumptions about market structure.
Mistakenly assuming a monopoly market is likely to be the worst case producer error.

The market in the oligopoly is responding to the total production. Each ABM producer,
assuming itself a monopoly, estimates marginal price based on its own production changes.
For example, if there are ve identical producers and they all decrease production level in the
same period by the same amount, each will overestimate the marginal price by a factor of ve.
This is canceled out, however, because each producer underestimates the required production
change based on the overestimated marginal price. The change to total production is the
sum of the changes made by all ve producers, and the production change made by each
producer has the desired eect after all.
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If the producers are not identical, however, they will not be making margin price calculations at the same time and, therefore, will not be adjusting production levels simultaneously.
In the oligopoly ABM, asymmetry among the producers is introduced by giving each one
an initial resource stock from a tight distribution about a mean. The resource stock level
is used to estimate the straight-line descending production path, so that each producer will
have, in principle, a dierent initial production path. In practice, however, the step sizes in
the ramp-up to the production path are large compared with the distribution of production
paths, so that multiple producers are likely to nd the same production path.

With ve

producers, they typically fall into two groups, one at a production path slightly above the
other. What happens next depends on the relative stock levels of the group members.

If there isn't much dierence in the stock levels of the producers, they will behave much
as they would with uniform stock levels.

That is, changing production simultaneously,

overestimating marginal price and underestimating production levels. These producers will
all follow the straight-line descending production path, appearing to collude to divide the
monopoly rent.

If, on the other hand, some of the producers reach their production path a period earlier
than the others, they will begin on the straight-line descending path one period earlier than
the others. The others have seen their marginal prot increase without reducing their production, so they will maintain production. In the next period, the bigger producers again
decrease production, causing price to increase, leading the smaller producers to mistakenly
conclude that maintaining their production level is increasing their marginal prot.

This

continues until the smaller producers deplete their stocks, which happens well before the
others since they've been producing at a constant higher level. At this point the remaining
producers see a spike in marginal price, since the total market production has decreased drastically, but it doesn't aect their behavior: they continue along the straight-line descending
production path until their stocks are also depleted.

The latter outcome is a Cournot equilibrium, since each producer is making production
decisions based on the production decisions of the others (as seen through the marginal
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price), and total production is greater than the collusive level, but considerably less than
the perfectly competitive level.

In either case, the outcome has the appearance of cooperative behavior, yet the producers
have no means to cooperate. This has limited implications for real-world producers, since the
likelihood is small that many producers will have the same technology at the same production
levels and with nearly identical stock levels.

The collusion-like outcome is validated by

converging to the costless monopoly results. The Cournot-like behavior, though unexpected,
illustrates the possibility for discovering new behaviors with agent-based models.

1.5 The ABM and the consequences of taxation
The models summarized in Section 1.3 examine costs as a consequence of production. If,
on the other hand, the costs are treated as taxes on an otherwise costless technology, total
welfare now encompasses the eectiveness of the taxes in achieving their scal goals. In all
cases, taxes result in a transfer of producer surplus to public welfare. When equilibrium price
or quantity is aected by taxation, total welfare must take deadweight loss into account.

The eects of the dierent cost models as taxes are based on the results discussed in
Section 1.3. In addition to the xed cost, marginal cost and stock cost models, an additional
cost model is introduced in this discussion: royalties, which are levied as a percentage of
prot. Suppose the goal of a tax policy is to extend the viable lifetime of a nonrenewable
resource, or to mitigate a pollution externality, or to create revenue to fund public education.
These ABMs show which policies slow production and which accelerate it, which reduce
pollution externalities and which worsen them, and how much deadweight loss each policy
incurs. These results are consistent with the literature and extend the theoretical models by
illlustrating the additional impact of the planning errors discussed in Section ??.
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1.6 Chapter organization
The preceding is a high-level overview, the details of which are explored in the following
chapters. Chapter 2 presents the related research and places this work in the context of the
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the basics of agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling
is not new to the eld of Economics but neither is its use widespread.

Section 2.4 also

includes a high-level overview of MASON, the ABM framework used for these models, which
provides the basic tools for simulation and data visualization.

Chapter 3 reviews the theory behind Hotelling's Rule and presents the theoretically
expected outcomes when introducing dierent production technologies. The basic approach
is through optimal control theory, carrying the general solutions as far as they can be taken,
then proceeding with a specic demand function from Hotelling. This chapter focuses entirely
on the mathematical results: their interpretation will come into play in the discussions of
Chapter 6.

Chapter 4 denes and describes the specic ABM used in this study.

The behavior

of interest initially is prot maximization given a nite resource, and in this model the
producer agent is endowed with the heuristic decision process described in Section 4.3. The
optimization heuristic is a simple set of rules and some basic mathematics with which a
producer can make a crude estimate of total prot given a small set of production paths.
The details of the actual simulation process are also presented in Chapter 4.

The simulation results are shown in Chapter 5, primarily in the form of graphs. Some
of the results are presented as time-series plots, which is natural given dynamic simulation,
but much of the results of interest occur in phase space: a space dened by the objective
(prot maximization), the theoretical constraint (interest rate) and the behavioral outcome
variable (percent change in marginal prot).

Chapter 6 discusses the results presented in Chapter 5 and compares them with the
theoretical expectations developed in Chapter 3. The behavioral interpretation of the math-
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ematics is combined with the economics interpretation of the simulations.
Chapter 7 examines the eect of taxes in the context of the ABM. In general, taxes take
the form of the various cost structures presented in the preceding chapters, where a cost for
the producer is income for the policy-maker.
Chapter 8 summarizes the relationship between theoretical and practical (meaning computer simulated) outcomes.

This chapter will also discuss some of the ways in which the

ABM models can be extended to explore additional aspects of natural resource production.
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Chapter 2

Background

Gaudet (2007) presents an excellent historical and contextual background for Hotelling's
1931 paper, from which the points in this paragraph are excerpted. The potential exhaustion of natural resources was a politically charged topic in the early twentieth century. Early
economic models of exhaustible natural resources were based on static equilibrium, motivating Hotelling to develop a dynamical model. The result was a rst-order optimization,
with reference to specic cases requiring calculus of variations. Though straightforward by
modern standards, the approach was mathematically sophisticated for the time, so the key
nding languished until interest in exhaustible resources reemerged in the 1970s. Modern
natural resource economics arose in response to the Club of Rome report Limits to Growth
(Meadows et al., 1972), which was interpreted as predicting depletion of petroleum by 1992

1

and other key resources within 100 years.

Literature relating population growth to limited resources dates back, at least, to Jonathan
Swift's satire A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland From
Being a Burden on Their Parents or Country, and for Making Them Benecial to the Publick, published anonymously in 1729. Nearly 70 years later, also publishing anonymously,

1 The

report estimates the lifetime of known reserves at the time of writing, noting that new

reserves will be found, but that these resources are, utlimately, nite.
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Thomas Malthus introduced exponential growth models in An Essay on the Principle of
Population, as it aects the future improvement of society with remarks on the speculations
of Mr.

Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers.

Malthus's developed his now famous

economic models to refute the writings of William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet
that implied there were no limits to growth in Europe.

Between Swift and Malthus, Adam Smith, in 1776, published The Wealth of Nations,
setting the stage for market-based analysis of exhaustible resources.

Then, 19 years after

Malthus, David Ricardo published his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, introducing the notion of economic prots in the form of rent. Ricardian rent reects that, for two
pieces of land that are indentical in every other way (including marginal cost), a landowner
receives additional rent for the more productive land. In Principals of Political Economy,
John Stuart Mill, in 1848, integrated Adam Smith's free markets, malthusian limits on resources, and ricardian rents with a model of the role of technological advancement.

By the time of the Club of Rome report, economists were prepared to respond to it,
and at the core of that response was Hotelling's 1931 paper, the central point of Robert
Solow's 1973 Ely Lecture to the American Economics Association (Solow, 1974).

Solow's

paper, along with a number of other papers from 1974, are introduced in the following
sections. Thera are a number of historical reviews of the literature descending from Hotelling.
Devarajan and Fisher (1981) review the rst fty years of theoretical developments based on
the Hotelling model. Much of that work is shown to pertain to issues that Hotelling raised
but did not pursue, such as the eects of cumulative production and uncertainty in stock
size.

Krautkraemer (1998) adds another decade and a half and includes developments in

the econometric search for evidence of Hotelling's Rule. Another ten years are added to the
Hotelling time line by Livernois (2009).

There are two broad areas of interest in the Hotelling's Rule literature: theoretical efforts to widen the scope of Hotelling's Rule, and econometric eorts to nd evidence of the
Hotelling's Rule outcome. Section 2.1 reviews developments in the theory, while Section 2.2
examines the evidence for scarcity rents in nonrenewable resource markets.
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2.1 The evolving theory of nonrenewable resources
The essence of Hotelling's nding is that in any market for a nonrenewable resource,
monopoly to competitive, market prices will exceed marginal costs by the scarcity rent.
Furthermore, economically ecient production of the resource will require that the rent, and
therefore, net price, will increase at the discount rate. Were the latter not the case, resource
owners would either divest if prices rise slower than this, or let the resource stock appreciate
in situ if prices rise more quickly.

Resource rents are made up of ricardian rent plus scarcity rent. Suppose that there are
two pieces of land that are identical in every way (including marginal cost), diering only
in the quality of a resource they hold. The land owner may receive rents (payments above
marginal cost) for both pieces of land due to the presence of the resource. The owner will
receive a larger rent for the piece of land with higher quality resource, and this is ricardian
rent. If the resource is being extracted, the rent will increase by r-percent, and this increase
is scarcity rent. That is, ricardian rent reects the fact that the land has a valuable attribute,
and scarcity rent reects that fact that the attribute can be used up.

Many important aspects of natural resource markets follow from Hotelling's Rule. Not
only is it optimal for the owner of a resource to prot from its scarcity, but it is the only
way that the resource will be produced. The economic prot that arises because a resource
is becoming more scarce is called scarcity rent, because the market price is greater than the
marginal cost. Scarcity rent is also often called the user cost because it reects an additional
cost that is related to using up the resource. That is, it is the opportunity cost of forgoing
the future benet, including appreciation, of the next unit being produced.

Another consequence of Hotelling's Rule is that higher quality resources will be extracted
before lower quality. Consider the previous example of two identical pieces of land that dier
only in the quality of resource they contain. Presumably, the higher-quality deposit results
in lower cost per ton of processed ore. As the lower cost (higher quality) ore is produced,
the user cost (scarcity rent) increases until total cost equals that of the higher cost (lower
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quality) ore. Then, the lower quality ore will be produced.

The production of nonrenewable resources is made complex by the existence of multiple
grades (or costs) of deposits, changes in known reserves (discovery), trends in substitutes and
and in backstop technologies. These complexities tend to weaken or obscure the coupling
between prices and scarcity rent. Solow (1974, p. 3) suggests that if extraction costs fall
by more than scarcity rents increase, the trend in market price may be downward.
notes, however, that eventually scarcity rent will dominate market price.

He

Krautkraemer

(1998) presents theoretical extensions to the Hotelling model to take into account variable
stock levels due to exploration, cost of capital, capacity constraints, ore quality, and market
imperfections.

Heal (1976) presents a model in which stock eects produce a declining resource value.
Levhari and Liviatan (1977) explore the conditions under which a resource becomes economically nonviable but not physically depleted, a situation that arises with cumulative
production (stock) costs. Livernois and Martin (2001) explore circumstances in which market prices rise while scarcity rents decline to zero because of resource degradation.

Pindyck (1978) and Livernois and Uhler (1987) suggest that bringing new deposits into
production as the result of exploration produces a U-shaped price path. Slade (1982) proposes a U-shaped price trend due to technological advances early in production and scarcity
rents late in production. Similarly, Dasgupta and Heal (1980) and Arrow and Chang (1982)
propose models of exploration that produce a saw-tooth price curve. Cairns and Van Quyen
(1998) propose a model that combines exploration and stock eects in which the price trend
is downward for most of the stock lifetime, but rises to the choke price at the end.

The

evidence for these price curves is discussed in the next section.

Much of the preceding theoretical development is motivated by studies of various resource
markets in which no long-term price increase is evidenced. Each represents a major undertaking to explore a simple extension of the Hotelling model, with the exception of Cairns
and Van Quyen (1998), which incorporates two simple extensions.
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Hotelling presents a perfectly competitive model and a monopoly model, then makes
suggestions as to what happens in a duopoly market (Hotelling, 1931, sec. 15). He notes
that with an exhaustible resource, where each competitor is optimizing based on the assumed
optimization of the others, there is an incentive for a competitor to unilaterally raise its price
by a small amount.

Consider, for example, a duopoly at Cournot equilibrium.

For a product that is not

exhaustible, there is an incentive for a producer to lower its price slightly, taking sales from
the competitor unless the competitor reciprocates, ultimately driving prots to zero.

For

a nonrenewable resource, however, lowering price and taking sales early in the lifetime of
the stock for a small increase in prot leaves the higher-price producer in the position of
having additional stock late in the lifetime of the stock, when prots are higher. Thus, with
a nonrenewable resource there is a disincentive to cheat by lowering price.

If, from the initial Cournot equilbrium, the cheater increases price sightly, there are two
possible outcomes.

If the competitor reciprocates, market price goes immediately to the

higher price, and they both enjoy increased prot (until they reach the monopoly equilibrium). If the competitor does not reciprocate, the competitor is forced into the role of the
price-lowering cheater described in the previous paragraph.

Salant (1976) presents a model of prices in an oligopoly market for an exhaustible resource. An intriguing outcome of this model is that, for a market where some competitors
form a cartel and the rest do not, a portion of the scarcity rents is transferred away from
the cartel to be shared by the competitive fringe.

Stiglitz (1976) observes that a monopoly in an exhaustible resource market has less market
power than in the market for a non-exhaustible resource. This point is supported by Lewis
et al. (1979) and conrmed by Pindyck (1987).

This result is challenged by Gaudet and

Lasserre (1988), however, who point out the Stiglitz model assumes innite input capacity,
while inputs in the exhaustible models are, by denition, limited. By treating the monopoly
and competitive models as having the same input capacity constraint, Gaudet and Lasserre
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show that the monopolist's market power is the same whether the resource is exhaustible or
not.

The principal barrier to theoretical expansion of the Hotelling model is that dynamic
optimization is dicult to characterize in general terms.

Hotelling found it necessary to

resort to specic demand functions in order to explore implications of the base, costless
model.

Livernois (2009) notes that the Hotelling model becomes complex when extended

to include factors like resource degradation. Krautkraemer (1998) makes general statements
about the stock cost term by breaking the base case into a benet term and a cost term, but
does not carry the theoretical development into the extensions.

At present, there is no literature on agent-based models of nonrenewable resources.
Agent-based modeling can be a laboratory for exploring and experimenting with proposed
extensions to the Hotelling model. Agent-based modeling is a causal framework, meaning
that the researcher must express the behavior in terms of what an agent - a resource producer, for example - would do under conditions that arise in simulation. For an exploration
model in which the resource deposits are discovered in decreasing quality (Pindyck, 1987,
Livernois and Uhler, 1987), the new deposits come into existence sequentially: each deposit
is exploited until its costs equal those of the next most costly (lesser quality) deposit, then
production shifts to that one. In other models the quality of newly discovered deposits is
random (Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn, 1989), which has the eect of attening the price
curve. In a hypothetical agent-based model, the producer agent would be given a behavioral rule to produce whichever deposit is least costly to produce, which would work for
either class of exploration model. In this hypothetical agent-based model, a parameter would
determine whether new deposits are discovered in decreasing quality or random quality.

A limitation to extending the theory of Hotelling's model to oligopoly markets is that
a market structure must be assumed. For the agent-based models in this dissertation, an
oligopoly market is the same as a monopoly market with additional agents.

The market

structure is, therefore, an endogenous feature of the simulation, with the outcome depending
on the kinds of communication the modeler has given the agents.

Chapter 2.

Background

22

Agent-based modeling in support of theoretical development is said to have an objective
of  qualitative insight and theory generation (Tesfatsion, 2006). In the sense of any model,
it is predictive.

The modeler denes the behavior space (rules and initial conditions) and

explores the outcome space.

2.2 Studies of the markets for nonrenewable resources
A decade before the birth of modern environmental and natural resource economics in
the 1970s, Barnett and Morse (1963) nds that, over the period 1870 to 1957, resource prices
show no discernible trend, despite continuous and often rapid increases in their production.
More then a decade and a half later, Smith (1979) conrms these ndings using more sophisticated techniques on data from 1900 to 1973. Fisher (1981, p. 102-103) concurs that
there are no discernible trends in overall resource prices in the results of Barnett and Morse
(1963), but notes that factor costs fell more rapidly than resource prices during this period,
so there is evidence for some increase in rents during that time. Alternatively, Brown and
Field (1978) assert that Barnett and Morse neglected to include some factor costs, notably
transportation.

Brown and Field point out that the rst three-quarters of the twentieth

century - the period covered by the study - was a period of dramatic technical and social
change. "In a world of rapid technological change ... unit extraction cost will fail to increase
even though a natural resource is becoming more scarce." (Brown and Field, 1978, p. 231)

Halvorsen and Smith (1991) note that the principal obstacle to empirical tests of the
theory of exhaustible resources has been data availability. Since mine owners do not reveal
actual marginal costs, so that actual user cost is not observable, many of the market studies
are essentially assessments of the suitability of proxies for these.

Nordhaus (1973) compares the price paths of dierent sources and grades of energy
resources with the price paths of the good produced using them. Nordhaus (1973, p. 566)
observes that, on the average, scarcity rents on energy resources were "quite modest," or
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about one dollar per barrel of petroleum.

2

He notes that the exception was petroleum

itself, for which market prices were 2.4 times his calculated optimal price, which includes
scarcity rent.

A year later, Nordhaus (1974) found no trend in scarcity rents in mineral

prices between 1900 and 1970. Nordhaus is responsible for the term "backstop technology,"
referring to nuclear power as the technology that would, ultimately, limit the maximum price
on petroleum and eliminate energy scarcity (Nordhaus, 1973, p. 532).
Some researchers have found evidence of U-shaped price curves, such as Slade (1982), who
postulated that the price trend was due to falling input costs early in production and rising
scarcity costs at the end of resource lifetime. Berck and Roberts (1996) examine a larger data
set that includes most of the data used by Slade. They nd that price predictions depend
on whether prices are modeled as trend-stationary or as dierence-stationary.

They also

nd that trend-stationary models predict rising resource prices while dierence-stationary
models are ambiguous.
Heal and Barrow (1980) develop an arbitrage model which is an attempt to detect,
directly, the Hotelling outcome.

They assert that, in an ecient resource market, there

will be a strong association between the rates of change of resource prices and the rates of
return on other assets. They found, however, that changes in interest rates were the relevant
explanatory variables, not the interest rate levels. They conclude that simple equilibrium
theory is inadequate to the complexity of the problem.
Stollery (1983) estimates the cost function for the price-leader in the nickel market and
infers user cost by subtracting marginal cost from market price. User cost is found to be low
initially, but to increase by 15 percent. Farrow (1985), using proprietary mine data, presents
a model to estimate the in situ value of the stock and compares that with the price trend.
He does not nd evidence of Hotelling's Rule.
Halvorsen and Smith (1984) introduce duality to estimate in situ stock value for Canadian

2 For

the years 1970-1973, crude oil prices averaged less than three dollars per barrel in current

dollars. http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb1107.html (accessed 14 April 2011)
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metal mines and nd that user cost decreased considerably. Chermak and Patrick (2001)
also appeal to duality to estimate in situ stock value, and nd that, for 29 natural gas wells,
the trend is consistent with Hotelling's Rule.

Agostini (2006) found no evidence of U.S. copper companies exercising oligopoly market
power before 1978, when U.S. copper went on the world market.

He suggests a possible

explanation is that the copper rms did exercise market power for brief periods, but limited
prices during periods of high demand as a barrier to new entrants.

Halvorsen and Smith

(1991) conclude that the ability of the theory of exhaustible resources to describe and predict
the actual behavior of resource markets remains an open question.

Agent-based modeling can be used as a method for nonlinear regression.

Given a set

of target outcomes (market data), a hypothetical ABM can systematically vary behavioral
rules and initial conditions until simulation outcomes converge to the target outcomes. For
example, in the Agostini (2006) model, the hypothetical ABM producers might switch from
prot maximizing to risk averse as the price approaches a threshold. The threshold itself
can be fuzzy in this hypothetical model, meaning it has a stochastic distribution which may,
in turn, be dependent on price history, trends in substitutes or complements, and so on.

Agent-based modeling to explore behavior space in order to explain outcomes is said
to have an objective of "empirical understanding (Tesfatsion, 2006), and such models are
referred to as  generative (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). It is analytical : the modeler denes
the target outcome space, then varies the behavior space (rules and initial conditions) until
outcomes fall within the target outcome space.

2.3 The basics of agent-based modeling
In economics there are two dierent uses of the term agent. In the principal-agent problem, an agent is someone who does something for the principal (Varian, 1992, p.

441).

Alternatively, an agent is dened as a self-interested actor with an endogenous state (e.g.
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income and wealth), as well as a representation of behavior (e.g. utility function for a consumer, production function for a producer). Though typically implicit in economic models,
there may also be exogenous state variables (e.g.

GDP) and behaviors (e.g.

a supply or

demand function.)

In agent-based modeling, the model is a computer program representation of each agent.
In agent-based modeling, the term endogenous is used to imply autonomy. By contrast, the
term exogenous is used to imply that agents are being told what to do. In a simple ABM of
ocking birds, for example, if each bird decides on the best distance to be from all nearby
birds, that is an endogenous behavior rule. The fact that they want to be together at all,
however, may be imposed, making that an exogenous behavior rule. In its broadest usage,
agent-based modeling also includes computer simulations of a model in which agents interact
via their behaviors and modify their own states, the states of other agents, or the exogenous
state.

The last statement begs some denitions. Practitioners of modeling and simulation will
often use the terms model and simulation in ways that make them sound interchangeable
(Department of Defense, 1998, p. 138). They are not, however, and confused readers are in
good company on this topic. Just as in economics or architecture, a computer model is an

abstraction of reality. That is, it is not a complete description of reality, for many features
of reality have been omitted (because they're thought to be irrelevant) or abstracted (in
detail to reduce complexity in parameter space or in behavior, or to reduce complexity in
outcome space). By analogy, an architectural model may omit the details of subsurface soil
(parameter space), use decals to represent windows and doors (behavior space), and have
removable parts to expose functionality (outcome space).

Simulation is what a model does, or what you do with it.

As an example of the rst

meaning, a model may include some number of birds and the simple rules they follow: stay
close together, but not too close.

Simulation would involve running a computer program

that start all the birds in some position, gives them each a chance to react according to
their rule, then records their new positions, and does this over and over for some period of
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time. Depending on the rules, the motion (as portrayed by dots on a screen, for example)
may look like ocking, or it may look like swarming. As an example of the second meaning
of simulation, you might use that model "to simulate a ock of starlings", or "to simulate
crowds moving through a theme park." In other words, simulation is an abstraction of what
it does, much like modeling is an abstraction of what it is.

In any model, there are things about the agents that distinguish them from each other
and cause them to interact with each other or their environment. For example, in a basic
economic model, an agent may have a variable Wealth and a variable Preference, which
represents a preference for guns or butter as a real number between 0 and 1, with 0 for guns
and 1 for butter. The variables Wealth and Preference are a representation of an agent's

state. This particular model is not interesting without a means for agents to change state,
and that is accomplished through behavioral rules. Something like buy guns and butter in
the ratio reected by Preference until Wealth is depleted. In general, what is interesting in
a behavioral model like this is its development over time. That is, 1) each agent acts on its
state, 2) the action results in a change of state, 3) the new state results in new actions. The
time evolution of a model is performed in simulation, which simulates the passage of time
and any other exogenous changes while the actions of the agents bring about any endogenous
changes. The initial and terminal conditions are also aspects of simulation, so that the same
model may be used to simulate prosperity or poverty (average Wealth is either large or
small).

A model may include a large number of these agents, all with dierent preferences. The
number and types of agents, the things they are able to aect, and the rules they use to
aect those changes are all part of the model. What happens in the course of the agents
changing is the outcome of simulation.

Early agent-based models attempted to replicate simplied insect behaviors, such as
group movement (Reynolds, 1987) or an ant colony's quest for food (Epstein and Axtell,
1996). In the former, optimizing interactions between individuals leads to new behaviors like
ocking or swarming, while in the latter, self-optimization by individuals leads to positive
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group outcomes. In either case, the individual actors are the agents (each bee, bird, or ant),
and each agent has simple rules for its own behavior. The group behavior is not programmed,
and is said to be an emergent outcome of the model. It is the goal of autonomous agent-based
models to discover or explain emergent behaviors or outcomes. Other agent-based models
are computational models: the simulate large ensembles of individually optimized equations.
Both uses arise in this study, with autonomous agents as prot-maximizing producers, and
computational agents as their Hotelling's-Rule-following counterparts.

In the social sciences, one early adopter of agent-based modeling is Axelrod (1997b),
whose models started out as an extension of earlier work on the Prisoner's Dilemma in game
theory (Axelrod, 1987). Agent-based modeling arose as computation became faster, cheaper,
and widely available. Many of the behavioral models developed theoretically in the preceding decades, such as those of Axelrod (1987) and those of Schelling (1978) were well suited
to agent-based modeling. Epstein and Axtell, both jointly and separately, developed agentbased models including an adaptation of a cultural transmission model by Axelrod (Axtell
et al., 1996), the emergence of classes (Axtell et al., 1999) and civil violence (Epstein, 2002).
McFadzean et al. (2001) introduce agent-based modeling as a computational laboratory for
trade networks, and Tesfatsion (2001) applies the approach to an adaptive search model of
the labor market. The dynamic and emergent behaviors of agents in combat are examined
in Reynolds and Dixon (2001) and Dixon and Reynolds (2003), while the latter also presents
models of how a national bond market crisis spreads globally. Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005)
provide an overview of various topics in modeling and simulation of social systems, including agent-based modeling. Tesfatsion (2006) presents examples of agent-based models that
correspond to and often extend traditional economic models.

A note about the initials ABM. They are used to refer to the methodology of agent-based
modeling, or to an agent-based model.

That is we will use ABM to explore Hotelling's

Rule by constructing multiple ABMs, each representing a dierent cost structure. In this
dissertation, agent-based modeling is referenced in its entirety, while the initials ABM are
reserved for a model.
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Although many ABMs are ad hoc computer programs, groups within the agent-based
community have developed programs to automate the modeling and simulation process to
some extent. One approach is to provide a complete agent-based modeling and simulation
program with which the user may create an agent-based model and run simulations. These
programs work much like spreadsheet or painting software.

An example is the NetLogo

project at the Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling.

A simple

NetLogo model can be constructed and simulated quickly, and there is large body of example
models as well as an extensive user community. Though it is technically not programming,
writing rules for behavior in NetLogo's unique language becomes very much like writing
computer programs.

The other approach to agent-based software is to provide a library of programs to manage
the modeling details of how to store and change agent state and how to communication
between agents, as well as simulation issues such as keeping (and advancing) system time,
managing simulation events, displaying state in real time, and saving simulation results.
These libraries are written in a specic computer language such as Java or Objective-C, and
a user is expected to do some programming to create the necessary agents and to program
any behaviors required. MASON, a project at George Mason University, is an example, and
is used for the modeling and simulation presented in the following chapters. More details on
MASON are presented in the next section.

As an example of a simple ABM, consider the segregation model of Schelling (1971). This
model was originally developed with coins and a checkerboard, but has since been a popular
model for software agents. The general model is a checkerboard where each cell is occupied
by an agent of one type (a copper coin, for example), an agent of another type (a silver
coin, for example), distributed randomly, and there are a few unoccupied squares.

Each

agent has a preference for a certain percentage of neighbors to be of the same type. Each
agent is given an opportunity to move into an unoccupied squares. The emergent behavior
is that even with a mild preference for like neighbors (33 percent for example), in only a few
turns the board is segregated into clusters of only copper coins or only silver coins. In this
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model, there are two agent types, each agent has a state that is the percentage of neighbors
of the same type, and each agent has a behavioral rule: move to an unoccupied square if the
percentage of like neighbors is less then the preference (e.g. 33 percent).

3

2.4 The MASON agent-based modeling platform
MASON (Luke et al., 2003) is a project of two organizations at George Mason University,
the Evolutionary Computation Laboratory and the George Mason University Center for Social Complexity.

4

MASON is one of a class of agent-based modeling and simulation software

that provides a set of programs to support modeling and simulation, but the user must do
some programming to make it work. This class of software is often referred to as a toolkit,
and the overall software as an agent-based modeling tool. MASON is written entirely in the
Java programming language, requiring a MASON modeler to be able to program in Java.
Most agent-based modeling tools use discrete-event simulation, meaning that time passes
in discrete units and some assumptions are made about the intervening period. In some cases
it is assumed that state variables evolved continuously during that time (bodies in motion
tend to stay in motion, for example). In other cases, the discrete time unit is intrinsic to
state, such as interest that is compounded daily.

As with other discrete-event tools, the

central feature of MASON is a means for scheduling time steps.

In this sense, MASON

regards each agent as an event on a schedule. Typically, after completing any actions for a
time step, agents either put themselves back, or are put back, on the schedule for the next
time step. MASON also provides a means to initialize agents at the start of a simulation,

3 Strictly

speaking, the original is a cellular automata model, but it is easily cast from a model

of the state of a square on the checkerboard to a decision of a coin to move into one, making it an
agent-based model. The Schelling Segregation Model is a common example in agent-based modeling
texts and courses. See, for example, Clark (1991) or Laurie and Jaggi (2003).
4 Information
and
software
downloads
can
be
http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/ (last accessed 21 May 2011)

found

at
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and a means to stop the simulation when a particular state occurs (such as an agent running
out of money or a certain time having elapsed).
The MASON Hotelling model developed for this dissertation can be downloaded

5

and

anyone with the MASON software can compile it and have it running in a minute or two.
MASON provides a variety of predened graphical user interface (GUI) windows, some of
which are shown in the Appendices.

The MASON windows (GUI components) serve two

purposes: 1) to provide a way to display features of a model and changes of state during a
simulation, and 2) to provide a means to set or change the parameters of a simulation. In
this sense, the act of model-building is extended a bit beyond the Java programming phase
by giving the user some limited means to aect the model or its simulation.

The models

described in Chapter 4 can be selected, initialized and run with the information provided in
the following paragraphs.
The interactive aspect of the MASON Hotelling model provides the non-programmer
user a means to participate in dening the model.

Specically, although each model of a

market structure was programmed in Java, the user is able to select from among twenty
market models. Similarly, the user can select from two demand functions.

6

Additionally, the

user can select the number of producers and the interest (discount) rate before starting the
simulation. Once the simulation is initialized, the user can modify the state of any agent,
such as starting production level, initial stock, and costs.
In more general agent-based modeling terms, selecting among the market models amounts
to selecting among behavior rules, while setting the demand function and other values is a
matter of setting simulation parameters. It would take a very long time to explore all the
permutations available at the time of writing, and the number of additional market models

5 http://www.unm.edu/~ddixon/ACE
6 There

(last accessed 21 May 2011)
are 20 market models (all of which are included in this dissertation) and 2 inverse

demand functions (of which only one is used in this dissertation) as of May 2011. (The unused
demand function is the competitive market model from Hotelling (1931, sec. 2)).
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7

comment like this is not without caveats. Performance is a decreasing concern as compu-

tational capabilities increase rapidly, but the program could reach the point where just selecting
among the options could take a very, very long time.

32

Chapter 3

Theory

"Problems of exhaustible assets cannot avoid the calculus of variations" noted Hotelling
(1931, p.

140), which may have been why his work languished until the 1970s (Gaudet,

2007, p. 1035). Since its advent, optimal control theory (Pontryagin, 1959, Pontryagin et al.,
1962) has become a standard tool for dynamic optimization in economics. Chiang (1992)
notes that, unlike calculus of variations, optimal control can be used with functions that are
piecewise continuous or that have corner solutions. The introductory optimal control problem
in Chiang (1992) is the Hotelling model. Caputo (2005) observes that optimal control theory
is more conducive to economic theory and intuition than calculus of variations.

The following is an optimal control development of the Hotelling monopoly model. The
terminology and some notation derive from Kamien and Schwartz (1981), in particular,
the use of

m(t)

as the current value multiplier. The notation for partial derivatives is bor-

rowed from Caputo (2005), and the economic interpretations are inuenced by Krautkraemer
(1998).
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3.1 Basic theory
The Hotelling monopoly model begins with a known xed stock

x0

of a nonrenewable

resource. The problem for the resource owner is to determine a production path
maximizes present value total net prot over the productive lifetime,
general, net prot

x(t)

π (q (t) , x (t) , t)

that

of the resource. In

is a function of production level, remaining stock level

and time. Assuming a constant discount rate

ˆ

r,

the optimal control problem is

T

e−rt π (q (t) , x (t) , t) dt

max J (q (t) , x (t)) =
q

T,

q(t)

(3.1)

0

subject to

ẋ (t) = −q (t)
x (0) = x0
x (t) ≥ 0

(3.2)

q (t) ≥ 0
ˆT
x0 ≥
q (t) dt

(3.3)

(3.4)

0
The rst constraint is also the state equation and will be discussed subsequently. The
next two constraints are the initial and terminal boundary conditions on the stock variable.
The fourth constraint ensures that production is never negative, and the fth ensures that
total production never exceeds total resource stock.
The current-value Hamiltonian to maximize (3.1) with resource stock costate variable

m(t)

is dened as

H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m) ≡ π (q (t) , x (t) , t) − m (t) q (t)

(3.5)
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The current-value formulation has the advantage that, since the ABM will be making decisions based on current state values, a direct comparison can be made between the state of
the ABM at time

m(t)

t and the optimal state of the Hamiltonian at time t.

The costate variable

is interpreted as the current-value shadow price of the resource stock at time

t.

This is

the user cost, the value of the next unit of remaining stock to be extracted.
The rst order necessary conditions include the state equation

∂H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m)
= ẋ (t) = −q (t)
∂m

(3.6)

which imposes the dynamical constraint that the remaining stock be reduced at the rate
of production, where

ẋ (t)

is the time derivative of

x (t).

The rst order necessary costate

equation is

ṁ (t) = rm (t) −

where

ṁ (t)

is the time derivative of

m (t).

∂H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m)
∂x (t)

If the Hamiltonian has no stock eect (no

(3.7)

x (t)

dependency), this equation requires that the shadow price increase at the discount rate. That
is, the shadow price increases at the same rate of an alternative investment. Depending on
its sign, the stock eect may accelerate or decelerate the increase in the shadow price, or,
for a suciently positive stock eect, cause the shadow price to decrease over time.
The rst order necessary optimality condition is

∂H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m)
= 0
∂q (t)

(3.8)

which is the condition for static optimum, requiring that the Hamiltonian be maximized at
all times. The transversality condition on the state variable is that
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m (T ) = 0, x (T ) = 0, m (T ) x (T ) = 0

(3.9)

which constrains the ending shadow price to be non-negative and the ending stock level to be
non-negative, but requires that the shadow value (mx) of the terminal stock must be zero.
That is, either the stock is physically depleted and

m (T )

x (T ) = 0,

or the ending shadow price

is zero. For nonzero ending stock, the requirement that the shadow price goes to zero

is intuitive, since terminating while there is remaining stock implies that it is not economic
to extract the next unit of stock. If the stock variable is constrained to end at some value,
the transversality condition on the Hamiltonian is that

e−rT H (T ) = 0

(3.10)

This ensures that the stock variable is stationary at the terminal time

T

(Chiang, 1992, p.

182).
The following relations are introduced for notational simplicity

∂
π (q (t) , x (t) , t)
∂q
∂
πx (q (t) , x (t) , t) =
π (q (t) , x (t) , t)
∂x
∂H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m)
Hq (q (T ) , x (T ) , T, m) =
∂q
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t) =

t=T

Substituting for the Hamiltonian in (3.7)

ṁ (t) = rm (t) − πx (q (t) , x (t) , t)
so that

(3.11)

πx (q (t) , x (t) , t) is the Hamiltonian stock eect to which the previous remarks apply.

That is, the rate at which the shadow price changes is either accelerated or decelerated by
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depending on its sign and, if

πx (q (t) , x (t) , t) = 0,

shadow price increases

at the discount rate.

Substituting for the Hamiltonian in (3.8)

πq (q (t) , x (t) , t) − m (t) = 0
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t) = m (t)

which establishes the link between marginal prot and shadow price.
into (3.11) to eliminate

ṁ (t),

then dividing by

(3.12)

Substituting (3.12)

πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)

π̇q (q (t) , x (t) , t)
πx (q (t) , x (t) , t)
= r−
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)

(3.13)

which is the general expression of Hotelling's Rule. For a production technology that has no
dependence on the stock level, this simplies to

π̇q (q (t) , x (t) , t)
= r
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)

(3.14)

which is the relation rst articulated by Hotelling. It states that, along the optimal production path, the percent change in marginal net prot is equal to the discount rate. Thus, for
a marginal net prot increase at a rate below r, it is optimal for the owner to extract the
resource immediately and invest the returns with a return of r. However, for a marginal net
prot increase at a rate above r, it is optimal for the owner to leave the resource in situ and
let it appreciate faster than the alternative investment.
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3.1.1 A benet-cost treatment
In the preceding discussion, in Hotelling's original models, and for the purposes of this
dissertation, the object of (3.1) is maximization of the producer's prot.

Krautkraemer

(1998) takes a more general, benet-cost approach that is instructive when expanding the
scope to include total welfare or social benet.

If a resource yields gross social benet
incurs costs

C (q (t) , x (t) , t),

B (q (t) , x (t) , t)

and the production technology

equation (3.5) becomes

H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m) ≡ [B (q (t) , x (t) , t) − C (q (t) , x (t) , t)] − m (t) q (t)

(3.15)

In this case, the optimality condition (3.8) is

Bq (q (t) , x (t) , t) − Cq (q (t) , x (t) , t) − m (t) = 0
Bq (q (t) , x (t) , t) = Cq (q (t) , x (t) , t) + m (t)

(3.16)

This condition requires that, at every moment in time, the marginal benet from producing
the resource exactly equals the marginal cost, which includes the user cost. Since the user
cost represents the cost of forgoing future benet, this is benet in the present that comes
at the expense of benet in the future.

When the same party is beneted in either case,

it represents and intertemporal preference. When they are dierent parties it represents an
externality.

3.2 The Hotelling monopoly demand function
Hotelling's inverse demand function for the monopoly market Hotelling (1931, sec. 4) is
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p =


1 − e−Kq /q

(3.17)

This is a stylized demand not linked to any real market. It is not known why Hotelling chose
it, but it has two pedagogical strengths. First, it yields tractable expressions for revenue and
marginal prot and secondly, it has no nite static maximum with respect to

q.

That is, it

can only be maximized in the dynamic context. Additionally, revenue

p (q) q = 1 − e−Kq
increases monotonically with

q,

a characteristic that is exploited in the models for which

revenue must be held above cost.

Because the revenue function increases monotonically,

there is a unique minimum production level

qmin

which corresponds to a minimum revenue.

Equation (3.17) is the inverse demand function used throughout this dissertation, in the
theoretical development and in the agent-based models. For Hotelling's costless production
technology, the optimal production path is easily solved in closed form. However, for the
nonzero-cost technologies, it is necessary to appeal to numerical solutions. In those cases,
and in the agent-based models, the parameter values used are

K = 5
r = (1 + 0.1)1/365.25 − 1 ≈ 2.16 × 10−4
x0 = 100
These are all stylized and unitless values.

K

is the choke price and this value is chosen to

be consistent with the other models used by Hotelling.

The discount rate is ten percent

per annum and is expressed in daily terms for use in and comparison with the agent-based
models. The initial stock

x0

is chosen so that simulations of the agent-based models are long

enough to be instructive yet short enough to be repeated many times.
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3.3 A costless monopoly model
Costless production technology means that there is no cost term, so that prot is equal
to revenue:

π (q (t)) = p (q (t)) q (t) .

(3.18)

An optimizing costless monopoly producer, facing the full demand function, determines the
optimal production path

q (t)

based on the discount rate

r,

the extent of stock

x0 ,

and any

other boundary conditions. For the costless model, the stock is physically depleted at time

T.

Given a specic inverse demand function, the procedure (after Hotelling (1931, sec. 4))

is:

1. Solve (3.12) for the production path

2. Solve (3.11) to get

3. Replace

m(t)

in

q (t)

in terms of

m(t).

m(t).

q(t)

and solve (3.10) to get

q (T )

in terms of

T.

4. Integrate (3.4) using the equality condition (because the stock is physically depleted)
to get

5. Solve

T

in terms of initial stock

q(0)

x0 .

to get the initial production level.

For any reasonable inverse demand function (or approximation thereof ) the terminal time

T

will be nite.

With the inverse demand function in Section 3.2, from step 1

π (q (t)) = 1 − e−Kq(t)

(3.19)

Chapter 3.

Theory

40

πq (q (t)) = Ke−Kq(t)

(3.20)

m (t) = Ke−Kq(t)
ln (K/m (t))
q (t) =
K

(3.21)
(3.22)

Equation (3.21) indicates that shadow price varies inversely with production level and has a
maximum of

K,

the choke price.

Note that since there is no

x(t)

term in (3.19),

πx = 0,

so that from step 2

ṁ (t) = rm (t)
m (t) = m0 ert

where

m0 is the initial shadow price.

(3.23)

The shadow price increases over time, which is intuitive,

given that, under production, the resource becomes more scarce over time.

From step 3

1
q (t) =
K



K
ln
− rt
m0



If the stock is to be physically depleted, the transversality condition (3.10)

H(T ) = 0

applies. This means that

H (T ) = 0 = 1 − e−Kq(T ) − mT qT

(3.24)
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is the solution. Now (3.24) can be solved for

T



1
K
0 =
ln
− rT
K
m0
ln (K/m0 )
T =
r

(3.25)

Substituting this back into (3.24) gives the production path

r
(T − t)
K

q (t) =

(3.26)

Equation (3.25) shows that higher discount rates promote more rapid depletion, which is
expected, as a higher discount rate increases the opportunity cost of not extracting. Equation
(3.26) shows that production follows a straight-line descending path that is increasingly steep
as the discount rate increases, as expected. The production level is also inversely proportional
to the choke price

K.

This is related to the inverse relationship of production with shadow

price: since shadow price is increasing toward K, production is decreasing proportional to
its inverse.
From step 4

ˆT
x0 =

ˆT
q (t) dt =

0

r
T =

r 2
r
(T − t) dt =
T
K
2K

(3.27)

0

2Kx0
r

(3.28)

Equation (3.28) makes explicit what was implied before: a higher discount results in a shorter
resource lifetime. Also, resource lifetime is proportional to the square root of its extent.
Finally, from step 5
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r
q (0) =

r
K

(T − 0) =

2rx0
K

(3.29)

The initial production level is proportional to the lifetime of the resource, which is proportional to the square root of its extent.

The initial production level is proportional to the

square root of the discount rate, moving production earlier as the discount rate increases,
as expected.

The inverse square root relation to choke price

K

is related to the inverse

relationship between production and shadow price, as discussed previously.
Since

x(T ) = 0,

the transversality condition (3.9) imposes no constraint on

m(t),

which

is

m (t) = Ke−r(T −t)
That is, the shadow price of the remaining stock increases to the choke price

(3.30)

K

as the stock

is physically depleted. Note also from (3.26) that

q̇ = −

r
K

(3.31)

which is constant and negative. As mentioned previously, production follows a straight-line
descending path. Finally, note that

π̇q (q (t) , t)
−K 2 q̇e−Kq(t)
=
=r
πq (q (t) , t)
Ke−Kq(t)
which is Hotelling's Rule.
The production path given by (3.26) maximizes present-value net prot over the lifetime
of the resource.

This is, by denition, the most prot a producer can ever get with this
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production technology and this demand function. Integrating (3.19) over the stock lifetime

T,

the theoretical maximum prot, therefore, is

ˆ
Πmax =
0

T



1
1 − e−Kq(t) e−rt dt =
1 − e−rT (1 + rT )
r

(3.32)

For purposes of comparison with other models that cannot be solved in closed form, using
the values from Section 3.2, the stock lifetime is 1958 days, and

Πmax = 358.33.

3.4 A xed cost model
Natural resource production often incurs xed cost, including capital costs, leases or other
per-period fees or taxes. Extractive industries tend to require large capital investments, and
capital can be regarded as a quasi-xed cost (Young, 1992). Hsiao and Chang (2002) have
a groundwater optimization model of in which well-drilling is a xed cost.
Consider a xed, per-period cost

c0 ,

so that net prot is

π (p (q (t)) , q (t)) = p (q (t)) · q (t) − c0

Because the cost is not dependent on

q (t)

or

x (t),

this cost does not aect the dynamical

constraints, appearing only in the solutions to the boundary conditions.
Inserting the demand function in

p (q (t))

(Section 3.2) this is

π (q (t)) = 1 − e−Kq(t) − c0

One characteristic of the revenue part of this is that it is monotonically increasing with

q.
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It can be anticipated, therefore, that there is some minimum production level,

qmin ,

below

which net prot is negative. Net prot is non-negative as long as

c0 ≤ 1 − e−Kq(t)
so that

qmin

1
=
ln
K



1
1 − c0


(3.33)

Marginal prot is positive as long as production remains above this level. For nonzero
terminal production

q(T )

cannot be zero. Clearly,

qmin

is zero for

c0 ,

c0 = 0.

The transversality condition (3.10)

H(T ) = 0

applies, which means that

1 − e−KqT − c0 − mT qT = 0
Using (3.21) to substitute

mT

e−KqT (1 − KqT ) = 1 − c0
1 + KqT
eKqT =
1 − c0

(3.34)

Equation (3.34) must be solved numerically. The solution is shown in Figure 3.1. The gure
shows that

qT > qmin

for all costs, so that the

qT > qmin

constraint is non-binding. Figure
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Figure 3.1: Fixed cost model - numerical solutions for terminal production level
The optimal production path starts at production level
the terminal production level,
prot production level,

qmin .

qT .

q(0)

qT .

and decreases continuously to

The production level is, at all times, well above the zero

Terminal time

T,

which decreases with increasing cost, is also

shown. The bottom graph shows total net prot, which is also user cost, as a function of
the xed cost rate.

3.1 also shows that terminal time

T

decreases sharply as cost increases, and that total net

prot (user cost) decreases steadily over the cost range. These are the theoretical outcomes
against which the ABMs are to be compared.

Note, in Figure 3.1, that
parallel to

q(0).

q(0)

is slightly steeper than

while

qT

is asymptotically

Thus, as the xed cost increases, more of total production is pushed toward

the present.

Replacing

qmin ,

m0

in (3.23) with

mT e−rT
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m (t) = m0 ert = mT e−rT ert
then using (3.21)

m (t) = Ke−KqT e−r(T −t)
so that



1
K
r
q (t) =
ln
= qT + (T − t)
−r(T
−t)
−Kq
Te
K
Ke
K

(3.35)

Thus, the initial production level is

q (0) = qT +

rT
K

(3.36)

which is also shown in Figure 3.1.
Stock lifetime T is calculated from

ˆT
x0 =

q (t) dt
0

= qT T +

rT 2
2K

so that

K
T =
r

r

2rx0
qT2 +
− qT
K

!
(3.37)
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which is shown in Figure 3.1. Substituting (3.37) back into (3.36)

r
q (0) =

qT2 +

2rx0
K

(3.38)

Total prot is

ˆT
Π

FC


1 − e−Kq(t) − c0 e−rt dt

=
0


1
=
1 − c0 − e−rT 1 − c0 + rT e−KqT
r
which reduces to (3.32) for

c0 = 0

the GAUSS code to solve for

qT

(for which

qT = 0).

and to compute

(3.39)

This is also shown in Figure 3.1, and

q(0), T

and total prot is included in the

Appendices.

3.5 A marginal cost model
Extractive technologies, like most production technologies, incur costs that are proportional to the level of production. Scott (1967) uses a quarrying example to illustrate that
economy of scale considerations at low levels of production, and problems of marketing,
delivery and storage at high levels of production, lead to a U-shaped marginal cost curve.
Cobb-Douglas models in which production level appears are found in econometric models of
nickel (Stollery, 1983) and copper (Young, 1992), for example. Conrad and Clark (1987, p.
165) give an example of a linear marginal cost associated with disposal of pollutants. For
simplicity, this model considers a stylized linear marginal cost with marginal cost
the net prot function is

π (p (q (t)) , q (t) , t) = p (q (t)) · q (t) − c1 · q (t)

c1 ,

so that
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In terms of the demand function in Section 3.2 this is

π (q (t)) = 1 − e−Kq(t) − c1 q (t)

The transversality condition depends on whether or not
There is no minimum production level

qmin

q(t)

(3.40)

can go to zero when

t = T.

as long as the cost goes to zero faster than the

revenue. This is the case as long as

e−Kq(t) ≤ 1 − c1 q (t)

(3.41)

Figure 3.2 shows graphs of the left-hand and right-hand sides of (3.41) for the parameter
values presented in Section 3.2.
the choke price (c1

< K ),

The graphs show that, for all marginal costs lower than

prot is non-negative as

maximum production level constraint,

qmax ,

q(t)

goes to zero. There is, however, a

above which prot is negative.

points at which the dashed line intersects the solid lines denes the values of

The locus of

qmax .

It will

be shown that this constraint is not binding, however.
The solution proceeds as for the costless monopoly model, with the same form for the
shadow price (3.21). Thus

1
q (t) =
K


ln

K



H (T ) = 0 is satised when q(T ) = 0,


1
K
0 =
ln
K
m0 erT + c1
m0 = (K − c1 ) e−rT


1
K
q (t) =
ln
K
(K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1

The transversality condition

(3.42)

m0 ert + c1
so

(3.43)
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Unlike the costless and xed cost models, the rate of change in the production path is
not constant, since

−Kq(t)

e

=

−K q̇e−Kq(t) =
q̇e−Kq(t) =
q̇ =

The terminal time

T

(K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1
K
r (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t)
 K

r (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1
c1
−
−
K
K
K
r h
c1 Kq(t) i
−
1− e
K
K

(3.44)

(3.45)

is found by integrating

ˆT
x0 =

K
1
ln
dt
K (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1

(3.46)

0

ˆT
Kx0 =

ln

K
dt
(K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1

0

Equation (3.46) is solved numerically in GAUSS using the parameters from Section 3.2. The
numerical solution for

T

as a function of marginal cost is shown in Figure 3.3. Once

T

for a

given marginal cost is known, the initial production level is determined from

1
q (0) =
K
Values of

q(0)



K
ln
(K − c1 ) e−rT + c1

corresponding to the numerical solutions for

T


(3.47)

are also shown in Figure 3.3.

Also shown in the gure are the ranges of the rate of change in production,
from (3.45). Note that

q̇(t)

q̇(t),

computed

starts negative and becomes more negative over the course of
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production, so that

q(0)

qmax

q(0), which is always above q(t), so that the maximum constraint never

is always above

is the maximum production level.

holds. The GAUSS procedures for solving

T

It is clear from this plot that

and computing total prot,

ΠM C are

included

in the Appendices.

To compute percent change in marginal net prot, substitute for the exponential on the
left-hand side of (3.44) and simplify

−K q̇

(K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1
r (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t)
=
K
K
r (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t)
q̇ = −
K (K − c1 ) e−r(T −t) + c1

−1
r
c1
r(T −t)
= −
1+
e
K
K − c1

From this it is obvious both that the magnitude of the rate of change decreases with increasing

c1 ,

and that the magnitude increases over time for a given

c1 .

Finally,

π̇q
−K 2 q̇e−Kq(t)
=
πq
Ke−Kq(t) − c1
K
= −K q̇
K − c1 eKq(t)


h r h
c1 Kq(t) ii
K
= −K −
1− e
K
K
K − c1 eKq(t)




K − c1 eKq(t)
K
= r
K
K − c1 eKq(t)
= r

which is Hotelling's Rule.
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3.6 A stock cost model
Stock costs - costs associated with cumulative production - are mentioned specically by
Hotelling (1931, p. 152) as a detail omitted from his model. Stock eects appear in many
forms in natural resource production models. Lecomber (1979, p 54) sites the examples of
decreasing pressure over the lifetime of an oil well, increased transportation costs as a mine
becomes deeper, and a reduction in yield as the quality of ore decreases.

1

Like marginal cost

models, stock cost models are often quadratic or in Cobb-Douglas form (Young, 1992).
The functional forms of stock eects in general vary broadly.

In shery models, for

example, the stock variable may appear in the growth function as second-degree polynomials
(Hanley et al., 1997, sec. 7.4). In econometric analysis of oil production in the U.K., Pesaran
(1990) nds that production cost is inversely proportional to remaining stock.

Pindyck

(1978) presents a production model that includes growth from exploration, and nds an
inverse relation between exploration and stock. Slade (1982) nds evidence of a cost curve
that is U-shaped in cumulative production. Tietenberg and Lewis (2000, p. 149) present a
resource model for which the stock cost is linear with cumulative production.
For simplicity, this model employs a stock cost that is linear in the stock variable
The stock cost

cS

is

cs (x(t)) = c2 (x0 − x(t))
where

c2

x (t).

(3.48)

is the marginal cost of stock depletion. Note that

ˆt
q(t0 )dt0

x0 − x(t) =
0

1 Slade

(1984) also points out that yield in copper mining depends on price: when the price is

high, more expensive processing is used, which increases the yield.
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is identical to a cost based on cumulative production.

The net prot function is

π (p (q (t)) , q (t) , t) = p (q (t)) · q (t) − c2 (x0 − x(t))
which, for the inverse demand function in Section 3.2, is

π (q (t) , x (t)) = 1 − e−Kq(t) − c2 [x0 − x (t)]

(3.49)

The derivative of the Hamiltonian is no longer zero

∂H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m)
= πx = c2
∂x (t)

(3.50)

so that, unlike the preceding models, the general form of Hotelling's Rule (3.13)

π̇q (q (t) , x (t) , t)
πx (q (t) , x (t) , t)
= r−
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)
applies rather than (3.14)

π̇q (q (t) , x (t) , t)
= r.
πq (q (t) , x (t) , t)
With cost based on cumulative production, it is possible for marginal cost to exceed
marginal revenue as the stock diminishes. Again it is necessary to invoke the non-negative
prot constraint, but unlike the xed cost and marginal cost models, this constraint can be
binding.
If production is to halt when cost exceeds revenue, the producer will optimize such that
(3.49) is non-negative at all times. For some values of

c2 ,

this can be maintained until the
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stock is physically depleted, and terminal shadow price can be positive.

In other cases,

however, this results in production ceasing before the stock is physically depleted, so that

x (T ) > 0.

In this case, the transversality condition (3.9) requires that

The rst order necessary condition for

Hq

From the rst order necessary condition for

m (T ) = 0.

proceeds as for the costless model up to (3.22).

Hx

(3.11)

ṁ (t) = rm (t) − c2
or

ṁ (t) − rm (t) = −c2

(3.51)

dm (t) ˙
− rm (t) = 0
dt
m (t) = Cert

(3.52)

Solving for the homogeneous part

which is equivalent to

m (t) e−rt = C.
Dierentiating the term on the left


d 
m (t) e−rt = e−rt [ṁ (t) − rm (t)]
dt
Multiplying both sides of 3.51 by

e−rt

and integrating

(3.53)
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ˆ

ˆ
−rt

[ṁ (t) − rm (t)] e

dt = −c2

e−rt dt.

Substituting the term in the left integral with 3.53 and integrating the term on the right

ˆ

Multiplying both sides by



c2  −rt
d 
m (t) e−rt dt =
e − 1 + C.
dt
r
ert

m (t) =

Solving for

C


c2 
1 − ert + Cert
r

using the yet-to-be-determined terminal shadow price

mT ,


c2 
1 − erT + CerT
r

c2  −rT
C = mT e−rT −
e
−1
r

mT =

so that

 n
o
c2  −rT
c2 
1 − ert + mT e−rT −
e
− 1 ert
r
r
c2 c2 rt
c2 −rT rt c2 rt
−rT rt
=
− e + mT e e − e e + e .
r
r
r
r

m (t) =

and nally

m (t) =


c2 
1 − e−r(T −t) + mT e−r(T −t) .
r

(3.54)
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There are two forms for the terminal Hamiltonian, depending on whether

x (T ) > 0.

For

x (T ) = 0, m (T ) > 0,

x (T ) = 0

or

so

H (T ) = 1 − e−Kq(T ) − c2 x0 − mT q (T ) = 0

which yields

e−Kq(T ) =

This has a unique solution for

q (T )

given

c2 ,

1 − c2 x 0
1 + Kq (T )
as long as

(3.55)

c2 <

1
. This is solved numerically
x0

in GAUSS.

The condition

x (T ) > 0 arises because marginal prot becomes negative before the stock

is physically depleted. Marginal prot going to zero implies also that shadow price of the
next unit of resource is zero. That is,

x (T ) > 0.

m (T ) = 0,

which is the transversality condition for

Prot going to zero provides an additional constraint on

q (T ),

1 − e−Kq(t) − c2 [x0 − x (T )] = 0
The rst order necessary condition (3.21) implies that, if

m (T ) = 0,

(3.56)

then

e−Kq(T ) = 0,

so

that (3.56) becomes

x (T ) = x0 −
Clearly, this only holds for

c2 ≥

1
. Thus,
x0

c2 =

1
c2

(3.57)

1
marks the transition between physical
x0

depletion of the stock with a non-zero terminal shadow price, and economic depletion, with
some physical stock remaining and a zero terminal shadow price. That is
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m (T ) > 0 , x (T ) = 0

for

c2 <

1
x0

m (T ) = 0 , x (T ) > 0

for

c2 >

1
x0

Finally, in this regime, the terminal Hamiltonian is

H (T ) = 1 − c2 (x0 − x (T )) = 0
which is satised by the terminal stock level (3.57). Finally, terminal time

T

is found by

integrating

ˆT
x0 − x (T ) =

q (t) dt

(3.58)

0

where

q (t) =

1
ln
K

The numerical solutions for the
computing

m (T )

(3.58) with

x (T ) = 0.

to nd the

T

for solving

q (T )

K
c2
r

[1 −

x (T ) = 0

e−r(T −t) ]

(3.59)

+ mT e−r(T −t)

regime involve solving for

q (T )

from (3.21), then numerically integrating (3.59) to nd the
For the

x (T ) > 0 regime, mT

that solves (3.58) where
and

T

x (T )

and for computing

using (3.55),

T

that solves

is assumed zero, and (3.59) is integrated

is found using (3.57). The GAUSS procedures

m0 , mT , xT ,

and total prot,

ΠSC are

included in

the Appendices.
On a nal note, (3.13) implies that the percent change in marginal net prot changes
over time, since

πx

is constant while

πq ,

equation (3.20), is a function of time. The percent

change in marginal net prot is positive for
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r >

πx
c2
=
−Kq(t)
πq
Ke

percent change in marginal net prot is computed from the derivative of

πq

with respect to

time

π̇q
=
πq
where

q̇

d
Ke−Kq(t)
dt
Ke−Kq(t)

= −K q̇

(3.60)

is the time rate of change in production. This is found by taking the derivative of

(3.21) with respect to time

d
d
Ke−Kq(t) =
m (t)
dt
dt
−K 2 q̇e−Kq(t) = ṁ
Substituting (3.12) into the left-hand side, and (3.60) into the right-hand side,

−Km (t) q̇(t) = rm (t) − c2


1
c2
q̇(t) = −
r−
K
m (t)
The slope of the production path changes over time, can be positive for some values of

c2 ,

and becomes innite when

m(T )

is zero. These outcomes have the following economic

interpretations. For a small stock cost, the shadow price increases as the stock is physically
depleted, as before, but the nal shadow price is lower if the stock cost is higher. At the
critical stock cost, the terminal shadow price is zero and the instantaneous slope of the
production path is innite. This reects the fact that the opportunity cost of the next unit
of production, were there one, would be zero. For stock costs above the critical stock cost,
the shadow price becomes zero before the stock is physically depleted, with more stock left
at higher stock costs. In this case the opportunity cost of the remaining stock is zero.
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3.7 Oligopoly models
Perhaps the most straightforward denition of an oligopoly market is in terms of what
it is not.

It is not a monopoly market - there is more than one producer.

Nor is it a

perfectly competitive market, if a perfectly competitive market is dened as one in which
there is a large number of producers, no one of which can aect the market equilibrium
when acting independently. There are only a few ways in which an oligopoly producer can
aect equilibrium, however, each depending on the reaction of the rest of the producers
in the market.

For example, total prot is maximized in a monopoly market, so if all

the oligopolists can agree to hold their combined production to the monopoly level, the
average prot per producer is maximum. This is an example of a collusion. At the other
extreme, they can engage in price competition, driving the price down to marginal cost and
eliminating economic prot altogether, and possibly driving higher-cost producers out of
the market.

This is the outcome of the price-competition, or Bertrand, oligopoly model.

The other possible outcomes are modeled based on quantity competition (Cournot oligopoly
model), market leadership (Stackelburg oligopoly model) or product dierentiation (Bertrand
oligopoly with product dierentiation).

These models have the distinction of giving the

producers levels of prot intermediate between collusion and perfect competition.

Qualitatively, the expectations of an oligopoly market are:

•

If the total production path is similar to the monopoly production path, it is a collusive
market

•

If total production is high and market price trends down to marginal cost then price
competition is occurring

•

If total production is higher than monopoly but lower than price competition, then
there is production-level cooperation (Cournot or Stackelburg) or price competition
with product dierentiation (Bertrand).
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Table 3.1: Production path comparison.

q(0)
q

model

2rx0
K

costless

q

xed

qT2 +

2rx0
K

slope

qT

π̇q /πq

− Kr

0

r

− Kr

> 0*

r

0

r

> 0**

r − c2 /πq

→ ∞***

r − c2 /πq

cost
marginal

1
K



ln (K−c1 )eK−rT +c1


− Kr 1 −

c1 Kq(t)
e
K



cost
stock
cost

c2 <
c2 ≥

1
x0
1
x0

1
K

ln

K

c2
[1−e−rT ]+mT e−rT
r

1
K

ln

K
c2
−rT ]
[1−e
r

*

Solved numerically from (3.34)

**

Solved numerically from (3.55)

***

Truncated at

qT  ∞

− Kr 1 −
− Kr

1−

c2 Kq(t)
e
rK

c2 Kq(t)
e
rK



by the numerical integration (3.58)

3.8 Summary
This chapter develops optimal control solutions to the production paths for the Hotelling
costless model plus extensions for xed cost, marginal cost, and stock cost production technologies.

For the inverse demand function in Section 3.2, only the costless model can be

solved in closed form.

The others are solved numerically using the parameter values in

Section 3.2.

Table 3.1 compares the production paths for the models in terms of initial production
level

q (0),

the slope of the production path, the terminal production level

percent change in marginal prot

π̇q /πq .

qT ,

and the

For the xed cost model, the initial production level

increases with cost. For the marginal cost model, Figure 3.3 shows that initial production
level decreases with cost. For the stock cost model, Figure 3.4 shows that initial production
level also decreases with cost.

For the xed cost model, the downward slope of the production path is identical to the
costless model. For the marginal cost model, the production path becomes less steep with
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increasing cost. For the stock cost model, the slope also becomes less steep with increasing
cost, becoming positive for
ending shadow price,

c2 > 1/x0 .

m(0) and mT

This is illustrated by the curves for starting and

in Figure 3.55. Recall that the production path trends in

the opposite direction of the shadow price. In the gure, shadow price trends upward when

m(0)

is below

c2 > 1/x0 .

mT ,

and downward otherwise.

Thus, the production path is increasing for

In all other cases and all other models, the production path trends downward.

Note also that in the stock cost model the shadow price eventually descends to zero as cost
increases, and that at costs above this, the nal stock reserve is non-zero.

These are the

costs at which the stock is economically depleted before it is physically depleted.
For the costless and marginal cost models the ending production level is zero. For the
xed cost model, Figure 3.1 shows that the ending production level trends upward with
increasing cost, nearly parallel to the starting production level. Thus, despite the fact that
the production path has the same downward slope as the costless model, the production
level starts and ends higher as cost increases. The higher production levels result in more
rapid physical depletion of the stock. For the stock cost model the ending production level
increases from zero as

c2

increases, going to innity for

c2 ≥ 1/x0 .

Were there a closed-form

solution for this model, an additional capacity constraint would have to be added, but the
numerical solution terminates when cumulative production reaches
instantaneous innite production level.

x0 ,

before reaching the
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Figure 3.2: The marginal cost model - theoretical values for minimum and maximum production for selected marginal costs.
Prot is positive whenever the dashed line is below the solid line for a given marginal cost.
For all costs less than 5 (the choke price), prot is non-negative in the vicinity of
The point where the dashed line crosses the solid line is
prot is non-negative over

0 ≤ q ≤ qmax

qmax

q = 0.

for that marginal cost. Thus,

for all marginal costs less than 5, and prot is zero

for all marginal costs greater than or equal to 5.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal cost model - numerical solutions for terminal time T.

T is

solved numerically from equation (3.46). Initial production level

Also shown is the production maximum

qmax

q(0)

is solved using

T.

computed from equation (3.41) using the

equality condition. The lower graph shows the production rate of change as a function of
marginal cost, with the arrow depicting the trajectory over time for a specic marginal
cost. Also shown in the bottom plot is total prot as a function of marginal cost.
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Figure 3.4: Stock cost model - theoretical values for terminal time, initial production level,
starting and ending shadow price, ending stock level, producer prot, and user cost as a
function of stock cost.

q (0), starting shadow price
m (0) and ending shadow price m (T ) as a function of stock cost parameter c2 . The middle
SC
plot shows the numerical solutions for terminal stock x (T ), total producer protΠ
, and
user cost as a function of c2 . The bottom plot shows termination time T , percent change

The top plot shows the numerical solutions for initial production

in marginal net prot and percent change in marginal net prot plus stock cost. This last
value should equal the discount rate (see equation 3.13).
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Chapter 4

The Hotelling Agent-based Models

The mathematical models used in this dissertation for Hotelling's Rule are presented in
Chapter 3.

This chapter will present the agent-based models (ABMs) that correspond to

those mathematical models.

This will, necessarily, include some discussion of the overall

ABM architecture, as well as some discussion of how the models will behave in simulation.
The details of the simulations will be discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will tie together the
mathematical models, the ABMs, and the simulation results.

4.1 ABM architecture
There are two general denitions of an agent in economics. The principal-agent model
denes an agent as someone who acts on the part of another (Varian, 1992, p. 441). In other
cases an agent is dened as a self-interested actor with an endogenous state (e.g. income
and wealth), as well as a representation of behavior (e.g. utility function for a consumer,

1

production function for a producer) . Though typically implicit in economic models, there
may also be exogenous state variables (e.g. GDP) and behaviors (e.g. a supply or demand

1 The

term is not dened, but denition can be inferred from the literature. See, for example,

Hartley (1996).
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function.) In agent-based modeling, the model is a computer program representation of the
agents. In its broadest usage, agent-based modeling also includes computer simulations of a
model in which agents interact via their behaviors and modify their own states, the states of
other agents, or the exogenous state (Epstein and Axtell, 1996, p. 4). Implicit in agent-based
modeling is that the agents are autonomous (Tesfatsion, 2006, p. 843).
In an ABM, it can be assumed that an agent is capable of solving the equations in the
Chapter 3.

This is the basis for the computational agent ABMs in Section 4.5.

For the

monopolist in a computation model, the initial production level is an initial condition and
the only required behavioral rule is to decrease production such that marginal prot increases
by r percent each time period.
The rest of the ABMs used in this dissertation suppose that the producers have no information about the demand function itself, each determining autonomously its own optimal
production path. The extent of the resource is known exactly, but the market structure and
demand function are unknown. These are adaptive agents for which the behavioral rule is
a heuristic to continually adjust the production level so that estimated total prot is maximized. Prot estimates are based on the observed market response to changes in production
level. In addition to the costless basic models, there are models with non-zero cost which
may be constant (per period), marginal (per unit production) or cumulative (proportional
to the stock level).

4.2 Simulation architecture
The models are constructed and the simulations run using the MASON

2

agent-based

modeling and simulation library and framework. They are based on and incorporated into a
set of programs included with MASON to demonstrate the MASON Console environment.
The Console provides a general graphical interface for editing model parameters, running

2 http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/

(last accessed on 23 May 2011)
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simulations and for viewing model variables as time-series graphs or numerical tables.
The graphical interface for each Hotelling model provides the ability to select a demand
function and one of the various market models, including monopoly and oligopoly variations
of the computation agent model, the adaptive agent costless model, models with dierent
distributions of initial stock, an overt collusion model, and Monte Carlo ensembles of costless,
xed-cost, marginal-cost, stock-cost and ad valorem cost monopolies.

These models are

described in the following sections. In the oligopoly models, the user is able to change the
number of producers in the market. Once a specic demand function and market model has
been selected, the user can change model-specic variables, such as the mean and standard
deviation for cost variables and initial stock levels. While running, the simulation displays a
custom window showing real-time plots of current prot, current percent change in marginal
prot, stock level and production level. Each model optionally writes a le of key dynamical
variables. These les were used to produce the plots presented in Chapter 5. Images of the
interface and results windows are included in the Appendices.
Each model has two agent types: a market agent and a producer agent. In a given model
there is a single market agent and one or more producer agents. The simulation is initialized
with Monte Carlo draws to produce values for the stochastic variables, then the simulation
proceeds, one time-step at a time, until all producers have stopped.

The producers stop

either because the resource stock level is zero, or prot in the current period is negative.

3

Because the agents are autonomous, the simulation behaviors are mediated by information
that is communicated between agents, specically between each rm agent and the market
agent. These exchanges occur as four distinct actions during each time-step, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. The size of a simulation time-step is arbitrary, though the default discount rate

3 In

some models, prot goes negative even though an alternative production level would produce

positive prot. A more advanced heuristic could explore alternative production levels to determine
if this is the case, but the simple heuristic does not. This is not dissimilar to a situation in which
the owner of the resource prefers to shut down leaving a small reserve rather than take the risk of
incurring further negative prots while searching for a protable production path.

Chapter 4.

The Hotelling Agent-based Models

67

is assumed daily and compounds to ten percent per annum. Changing the discount rate, via
the GUI, changes the implied time-step.

4.2.1 The market agent
The market agent, called Market, is assigned a demand function and controls any market
information provided to the producers. For the computational agent models, this means that
the market agent computes the initial production level for each producer. Both the specic
market agent and the demand function are user-selectable:

changing from one model to

another is simply a matter of changing the market agent and/or the market agent's demand
function. The market agent represents a specic market structure and production technology,
for example, there is a costless market agent, a xed-cost market agent, an oligopoly market
agent and so on.

4.2.2 The producer agent
In contrast, the producer agent, called Firm, is the same for all models. The producer
agent computes prot, marginal price, marginal prot and the percent change in marginal
prot for each time period. This information is used by the producer agent at the beginning
of each time period to compute the production level for the time period. At the end of the
time period, the agent subtracts that production level from the remaining stock, and the
market agent collects the production level, remaining stock, prot and costs for the real-time
displays. The user may choose to also write these data to a le for post-processing.

Although the producer is the optimizing agent, production level computation is done by
the market agent on behalf of the producer agent so that the details can vary depending on
the market model. For example, in the computational agent model, the production path is
in closed mathematical form, while in the rest of the models, a simple heuristic is used for
optimization. The heuristic is described in the following section.
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4.3 A simple optimization heuristic
The rst step in designing the model is to nd an optimization heuristic that is as simple as possible while reproducing plausible behavior. Algorithmic simplicity contributes to
robustness, that is, the ability to produce consistent behavior under the planned variety of
production technologies and market structures.

For example, in a tournament of bidding

algorithms, Rust et al. (1992) found that the simplest algorithms consistently beat the more
complex. Another advantage to simplicity is analytic transparency. The diculty in associating specic outcomes with specic behaviors increases as the complexity of the algorithms
increases. From an experimental control perspective, it is also easier to detect, explain and
compute the impact of algorithmic artifacts for a simple algorithm.

Algorithmic artifacts

may results from the size of the simulation time-step, the size of changes in production
level, or numerical errors in calculating prot, cost or production level changes. A possible
added benet of a simple algorithm is shorter computation times, since proper Monte Carlo
sampling calls for large numbers of simulations.

The core of the heuristic is a simple estimation of the present value of total prot over
the lifetime of the resource. The heuristic uses the prot estimation in two dierent ways,
depending on the phase of the simulation. The phases are:

1. Increase production level from zero until the estimated present value of total prot
begins to fall. This is called the ramp-up phase. This phase begins at time zero and
is repeated at every time step until the heuristic determines that production is on or
near the optimal production path.

2. Estimate the present value of total prot in each time period based on the three
candidate strategies: increase production, reduce production, or maintain current production. The strategy that yields the highest present value total prot is implemented.
This is the optimization phase.

The phase begins once the heuristic is on or near

the optimal production path, and is repeated every time step for the lifetime of the
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resource.

Each phase encompasses a number of time-steps.

The ramp-up phase is not intended to

simulate a real-world process, but it is a way for the heuristic to reach an ecient initial
production level autonomously.

The ramp-up phase provides an opportunity to estimate

marginal prot for use by the optimization heuristic.

The increments in production level

during the ramp-up phase are coarse in order to keep the phase brief, but the coarseness
makes it unlikely that an agent will reach the theoretically optimum production level exactly.
This introduces a source of error that is useful in exploring the consequence of setting the
initial production level sub-optimally.
For both the ramp-up phase and the optimization phase, future prot is estimated for
three strategies, one with constant decreasing production, one which maintains the current
production level, and one with constant increasing production.
assumes a constant decrease of

∆q ∗

The decreasing strategy

each time-step, which will produce a straight-line de-

creasing production path that goes to zero when the resource stock is physically depleted.
This is a simple geometric calculation that uses only information available to the agent. The
increasing strategy assumes a constant increase per period that is one percent of the production level in the current period. This, too, is a simple calculation using only information
available to the agent. The one percent increment is arbitrary, it is intended to be small, thus
preventing large swings in production level. It is also advantageous that it be dierent in
magnitude from the decreasing strategy, reducing the likelihood of non-damping oscillations.

4.3.1 The use of discrete summations
The following sections present the calculations used by the agents to determine the best
optimization strategy. In contrast to the integrals presented in Chapter 3, these are discrete
summations, and the derivatives are all discrete (e.g.∆q ,
the simulation itself employs discrete time.

∆p, ∆π ).

This reects the fact that

A producer agent has very little information

and estimates future prot by counting up the discounted prot per period until the stock
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Further advantage is taken of the fact that the producer agent's

strategies all assume constant changes to the production level

∆q , so that the amount of the

change itself comes out of the summations.

Just as the continuous solutions presented in Chapter 3 would serve as the limits on discrete theoretical models, they provide the limits on the ABM results as well. Furthermore,
the continuous solutions provide insights into the qualitative eects of parameters, such as
initial stock and costs, that otherwise may be obscure in the descrete theoretical models.
Finally, the potential exists in the ABMs to decouple the planning period and the production period, producing daily but planning quarterly, for example. Ultimately, however, the
continuous solutions set the theoretical limits on the simulation results.

4.3.2 The heuristic algorithm
Estimated discounted total prot is computed with all production in the future and prot
discounted accordingly. For a costless model, the total prot calculation is the summation

Πτ =

τ −1
X

qi pi (1 + r)−i

i=0

where

Πτ =

estimated total prot

qi =

production level in period

pi =

price in period

i

i

r =

discount rate

τ =

remaining lifetime of the stock
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4q

 which can be negative, positive, or zero

is

qi = qn + i4q
where

qn

is the base production level, meaning the production level at the time the estimate

is being computed, and
value for

4q

i

enumerates the production periods into the future. The choice of

is discussed at the end of this section. The production period

for the current production period

n.

i

starts at zero

Because the inverse demand function is unknown to

the agent, price is estimated based on the most recent marginal price


pi = pn + 4qi
where

pn

4p
4q


i−1

is the price in the current period, and



4p
4q


=
i−1

pi−1 − pi−2
qi−1 − qi−2

(4.1)

is the estimated marginal price based on price and production level changes between the
previous two periods. Estimated future prot becomes

τ −1
X





 
4p
Πτ (4q) =
(qn + i4q) pn + i4q
(1 + r)−i
4q
i−1
i=0


 


4p
4p
2
= qn pn A + 4q pn + qn
B + (4q)
C
4q i−1
4q i−1

(4.2)

where

A =

τ −1
X
i=0

(1 + r)−i =


1+r 
1 − (1 + r)−τ
r

(4.3)
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1
τ
B =
i (1 + r) =
A−
r
(1 + r)τ −1
i=0


τ −1
X
1
τ2
−i
2
C =
i (1 + r) =
2B + A −
r
(1 + r)τ −1
i=0
−i

(4.4)

(4.5)

The lifetime of the remaining stock comes from the constraint that total production equal
total current stock

xn =

τ −1
X
i=0

τ =
where

xn

τ (τ − 1)
2
 q
4q
− qn − 2 ±
q−

(qn + i4q) = τ qn + 4q

+ 2xn 4q

(4.6)

4q

is the reserve stock in the current period. There exists some minimum constant

production change

∆q ∗

for which the total remaining stock is exhausted, at which point

production goes to zero. For a given current production level
only one


4q 2
2

∆q ∗

and one

τ

qn

and stock level

xn ,

there is

that satises this. The lifetime in this case is constrained by

qn +

τ −1
X

∆q ∗ = 0

(4.7)

i=0
and the constraint that total production equal the current stock by

τ −1
X

(qn + i∆q ∗ ) = xn

(4.8)

i=0

Solving (4.7) for

∆q ∗

and substituting into (4.8)

τ =

2xn
−1
qn

(4.9)
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Substituting this back into (4.7),

∆q ∗ = −

This is the lowest (most negative)

qn2
2xn − qn

(4.10)

4q that will result in a straight-line decreasing production

path for which production goes to zero as the stock is physically depleted. This also satises
the constraint that the term in the radical in (4.6) be non-negative.

4.3.3 The inverse demand function and its parameters
For all of the ABMs discussed in this dissertation, the inverse demand function from
Hotelling and discussed in Section 3.2 is used. The parameter values from Section 3.2 are
also used in every simulation.

As a consequence, any two graphs throughout this disser-

tation can be compared to assess the impacts of the respective production technology or
market structure.

Although the simulations are, by necessity, numerical, it is hoped that

this similarity produces results that are qualitatively general, given the demand function.

4.4 Monopoly models
Initially, consistent with Hotelling, costless production is considered. The introduction of
nonzero cost will be presented in Section 4.7. In the computational agent models, production
decisions are based on optimization constrained by the inverse demand function. That is,
the producer agent implements the theoretical optimal control solution.

In the adaptive

agent models, production decisions use a heuristic that estimates future prot as described
in Section 4.3.
The theoretical maximum prot is shown in (3.32). The equivalent summation expression
is
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X

1−e

−Kqi

i=0



−i

(1 + r)
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i (1 + r)−T − e−rT
1+r h
−T
=
1 − (1 + r)
−
(4.11)
r
er (1 + r)−1 − 1

With the values given in Section 3.3, the discrete
continuous

Πmax = 358.33,

Πmax = 358.53,

as compared to the

the dierence being due to numerical errors. In practical terms,

the monopoly models are special cases of the oligopoly models, so simulation results of the
monopoly models are discussed in their respective oligopoly sections in Chapter 5.

4.5 The computational agent model
The computational agent models are used to benchmark the adaptive agent models. That
is, these models are only used to show the theoretical optimal control solution as it would
be implemented by perfectly optimizing agents.

These are not behavioral models per se :

the agents compute the production path using the solution to the constrained optimization
equations. Because they are not adaptive, the computational agent models are extremely
sensitive to numerical errors in simulation, as will be shown in Section 5.5.
In the computational agent models, the agent computes the rst-period production level
from (3.29). The agent has only two behavioral rules:

1. Adjust the production level to increase the marginal prot each period at the interest
rate. For the demand function in Section 3.2, this is equivalent to reducing production
by

r/K

(3.31).

2. Maintain the production level above zero until the stock is depleted.

The second rule is necessary because of numerical errors and the discrete nature of agentbased simulation.

That is, since the resource-owner is adjusting quantity on a per-period

basis (as opposed to continuously), the production level may reach zero while there is stock
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remaining.

This is prevented by foregoing the reduction in a given period if the amount

reduced is greater than or equal to the current production level until there is no stock
remaining. Because these simulations have ne granularity (time step size is one day), this
will typically only aect the nal period.

This is not entirely an artifact of simulation,

however: end of life considerations may aect real-world production decisions if planning
periods are long.

In these cases, Hotelling's Rule behavior may not be evident at end of

life even if all other conditions are met. Aside from the terminal boundary condition, the
production path should be nearly identical to the optimal (3.26) and total prot within
numerical error of the theoretical maximum (3.32).

4.6 The adaptive agent models
All of the models except the benchmark computational agent models are adaptive agent
models. In the adaptive agent models, the agent has no knowledge of the demand function,
and can only infer it from the observed behavior of the market.

Namely, the change in

price that results from changes in the production level. The agent has two behavioral rules,
corresponding to the two phases of the heuristic:

1. In the ramp-up phase, increase the production level from zero until estimated total
prot begins to decrease.

The default ramp-up rate is an increase of 0.01 units of

production per period.

2. In the optimization phase, in each period, each agent estimates total prot based on
the three production strategies, then executes the strategy that maximizes estimated
total prot.
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4.7 Production technologies with nonzero cost
The production technology models with nonzero cost are the costless adaptive agent
models with a nonzero cost term. This does not require a change in the producer agents,
which are implemented with cost variables, all of which were zero for the costless adaptive
agent model. Since revenue may now become less than cost, the behavioral rules are modied
to avoid negative prots. This is discussed in Chapter 5 with regard to specic cost functions.

4.7.1 Fixed cost model
Recall from Section 3.4 that, for the xed cost model, there is a minimum production
level

qmin

below which prot is negative. For the discrete calculations used by the heuristic,

the constraint (4.7) becomes

qn +

τ −1
X

∆q ∗ = qmin

(4.12)

i=0

which, when substituted into equation (4.8), means that equation (4.10) becomes

4q ∗ =

2
qn2 − qmin
2xn − qn + qmin

(4.13)

This is the largest possible reduction in production that results in a straight-line decreasing
production path that reaches

qmin

adaptive agent heuristic determines

at the moment the stock is physically depleted.

qmin

by increasing production starting from zero and

recording the production level at which prot becomes positive.

The estimate of future prot is

The
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C
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− c0

τ −1
X

(1 + r)−i

i=0

where

C
ΠN
τ

− c0 A

is the no-cost future prot estimate (4.2) and A is from (4.3).

A xed cost does not appear in

πq

or

πx , so according to equation (3.13), there is no eect

on the optimal percent change in marginal prot. The optimal production path is aected,
however, since the initial production level

q(0)

and the terminal production level

qT

both

increase with cost, as shown in Figure 3.1.

4.7.2 Marginal cost model
With no minimum production level constraint, the marginal cost model is identical to
the costless model. The change comes in the estimate of future prot

C
ΠM
τ

=

C
ΠN
τ

− c1

τ −1
X

(qn + i∆q) (1 + r)−i

i=0

"
C
= ΠN
− c1 q n
τ

τ −1
X

(1 + r)

i=0

−i

+ ∆q

τ −1
X

#
−i

i (1 + r)

i=0

C
= ΠN
− c1 (qn A + ∆qB)
τ

where

C
ΠN
τ

is the costless future prot estimate (4.2) and A and B are from equations (4.3)

and (4.4).

4.7.3 Stock cost model
With the addition of a stock cost as in (3.48), the future prot estimate becomes
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ΠSC
τ

=

C
ΠN
τ

−

τ −1
X

78

c2 (x0 − xi ) (1 + r)−i

i=0

=

C
ΠN
τ

− c2 x 0

C
= ΠN
− c3
τ

where

c3 ≡ c2 x 0 .

τ −1
X

(1 + r)

−i

+ c2

τ −1
X

i=0
τ
−1
X

i=0
τ
−1
X

i=0

i=0

(1 + r)−i + c2

(xn + ∆xi ) (1 + r)−i

The discrete form of equation (3.6) is

changing by the constant increment

∆q ,

C
ΠSC
= ΠN
− (c3 − c2 xn )
τ
τ

then

τ −1
X

∆x = −q .

∆xi = − (qn + i∆q).

(1 + r)−i − c2

τ −1
X

i=0
C
= ΠN
− (c3 − c2 xn + c2 qn )
τ

xi (1 + r)−i

=
where

C
ΠN
τ

Assuming that

q

is

Now, (4.14) becomes

(qn + i∆q) (1 + r)−i

i=0
τ −1
X

(1 + r)−i − c2 ∆q

τ −1
X

i=0
C
ΠN
τ

(4.14)

i (1 + r)−i

i=0

− [c3 − c2 (xn − qn )] A − c2 B∆q

is the costless future prot estimate (4.2) and A and B are from (4.3) and (4.4).

4.8 Other sources of uncertainty
If the producer is not certain of the extent of the resource

x0 ,

the consequent error in

the lifetime of the stock will aect estimates of future prots. This, in turn, may aect the
production strategy selected by the heuristic outlined above.

Although the heuristic can

adjust the rate of change as the stock is depleted, the total prot is sensitive to an error in
the initial production level. An initial quantity that is too high will, in general, result in
the resource being depleted too quickly, leaving unrealized prot in the future. An initial
quantity that is too low will, in general, result in the resource being depleted too slowly,
with unrealized prot in the present.
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Errors in initial stock level, or initial reserves

x0 ,

are similar to errors in the initial

production level, so Monte Carlo sampling in the neighborhood of the initial production level
will give an indication of sensitivity to errors in

x0 .

The relation between initial production

level and initial stock is given by equation (3.29). The coarseness of the heuristic strategy
serves as a proxy for errors in computing optima, including errors in

x0 .

This is illustrated

in the discussion in Section 5.5.
Other sources of uncertainty in the interest rate, in the demand function, and in the
production technology cost function could be explored in a similar manner.

Uncertainty

in the demand function can take on various forms, the simplest being random errors in
constants and systematic errors in functional form. In the former, a suciently large sample
reveals a constant variance while, in the latter, a large sample reveals variance that changes
over the range of production.

Uncertainty enters the cost function in ways similar to the

demand function.These issues are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Figure 4.1: The details of a time-step
The dashed box represents a single simulation time-step, during which four distinct actions
mediate the exchange of information between each producer agent and the market agent.

Initialization

Each producer
decides on
a production level

The market sums
total production
and sets the price

Each producer
computes profit
and updates
marginal price

The market
documents
total production,
price, profits, etc.

Any producers
still producing?
No
Done

Yes
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Chapter 5

The Hotelling Simulations

The mathematical models for Hotelling's Rule are presented in Chapter 3. The corresponding ABMs are described in Chapter 4. This chapter will present the simulation results
and discuss their characteristics. The discussion of how the simulation results compare with
the theoretical models is saved for Chapter 6, which will tie together the mathematical
models, the ABMs and the simulation results.

The ABMs are oligopoly models for which the monopoly results are special cases. The
oligopoly ABMs have one market agent and one or more producer agents, depending on
the number of producers in the market.

The number of producers is a user-set variable

in the GUI. In all oligopoly models except the explicit collusion model, each producer is
unaware of the others. In terms of the ABM architecture, this is done by not providing any
communication between producer agents.

The ensemble models are models in which there are multiple producer agents and multiple
market agents. Each pair of producer agent and market agent behaves like a monopoly with
dedicated stock and a dedicated market. Ensembles are a way to collect data about large
number of monopolists while running only one simulation. In these models, the monopolists
are all dierent because each one has been given production technology cost parameters
drawn at random from statistical distributions. This method of mapping the parameter space
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onto the outcome space is called Monte Carlo sampling. Monte Carlo sampling is preferred
to stepping over the range of values in regular intervals, which can produce spurious trends
that are artifacts of the size of the interval.

Also, by sampling at random intervals, the

Monte Carlo technique is less likely to skip over small intervals in which there are unusual
outcomes.

The rst sections will discuss the costless oligopoly models.

The monopoly model for

each production technology is presented as an oligopoly with one producer. The following
sections will address the ensemble models. The last section will examines the eciency of
the heuristic by introducing intentional error into the initial production level.

The models in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are intentionally wrong.

In these models the pro-

ducer always behaves as though it is a monopoly market, even though the models include
oligopolies of two to six producers. The object is to compare the erroneous results from the
computational agent models and those of the adaptive agent models. The total discounted
prot is compared of each model is compared with

5.0.1 The inverse demand function and its parameters
Recall from Chapter 4 that all ABMs use the inverse demand function from Section 3.2.
Similarly, the parameter values for all simulations in this chapter are from Section 3.2. The
graphs in the chapter can be compared directly, so that, given the demand function, the
qualitative dierences - in terms of the relative impacts of dierent technologies and the
eect of added producers - can be stressed.

5.1 The computational agent models
In the computational agent model, only the costless model is presented, since the production path cannot be solved in closed form for the production technologies with nonzero cost.
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The computational agent model serves two dierent purposes. The monopoly computational
agent model reproduces the theoretically optimal production path and is a benchmark for
the adaptive agent models. The oligopoly computational agent models, on the other hand,
represent the worst case, meaning the greatest possible error an optimizing agent is likely to
make in the presence of competitors. Recall that the producer agents in these models are
unaware of each other, and each producer agent sets a production plan as though it were a
monopoly market. The computational agents set the initial production level based on there
being no other product in the market. This is wrong by a factor of the number of producers
in the market. The adaptive agents, however, revise the production plan in each period and,
as a result, the production paths converge toward the optimal for the respective market size.

Figure 5.3 shows the time-series results of simulations of the monopoly and oligopoly
computational agent models with from two to six producers.

The theoretical optimum is

shown as the heavy solid line. With only one producer, which is following the theoretically
optimum production path, the theoretical and monopoly ABM curves are identical, as expected.

All models have identical production paths because all computational agents set

the production path based on the optimal control solution for a monopoly. In all cases, the
monopoly curve is completely obscured by the theoretical optimum curve.

Output per producer is identical in each model, so total production in the oligopoly
models is equal to the production level in the monopoly model times the number of producers.
The price curves reect the higher levels of production as the number of producers increases
in each model. The percent change in marginal prot scales with the number of producers,
as well. This is a consequence of each producer optimizing under the assumption of being
a monopoly. The percent change in marginal prot for the monopoly model is equal to the
discount rate, while it is the discount rate times the number of producers in the oligopoly
models. Finally, producer prot decreases with the number of producers, reecting the lower
prices with higher total production levels. In essence, these results are showing that, with an
incorrect assumption about the market structure, an agent that strictly follows Hotelling's
Rule performs very poorly. The following section will show how an adaptive agent, which
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appears to follow Hotelling's Rule when the conditions are optimal, is also able to make
production path corrections that reduce the penalty for an incorrect assumption of the
market structure.

5.2 The adaptive agent models
As discussed in Section 4.6, the adaptive agents use a simple heuristic to select an optimal production path. Figure 5.4 shows the the time-series results from the adaptive agent
model corresponding to the computational agent model in Section 5.1. In these models, each
producer has the same beginning stock. Unlike the computational agent model, where the
production path is xed for all producers, the heuristic leads to dierent production paths
depending on the number of producers in the market.

This is a results of each producer

agent using an estimate of the marginal price (4.1) based on assuming that the entire market response was due to that individual's production changes. The production path shows
the error due to the coarseness of the ramp-up production increases. The monopoly curve
starts somewhat above the Hotelling's Rule curve, and ends somewhat before. The heuristic
stopped the ramp-up phase at the rst time-stamp in which the decreasing strategy was
most protable, but the large ramp-up increase in production caused it to over-shoot the
optimum. Note that the price curves fan out, unlike the convergence to the choke price seen
in Figure 5.3.

This is a result of the daily Bayesian updates which allow the heuristic to

adapt to changes in the market due to all the producers, even though the producers are
unaware of each other. The percent change in marginal prot

∆πq /πq

monopoly producer, which is somewhat higher than the optimum of

is

3.03 × 10−4

2.61 × 10−4 .

for the
This is

also an artifact of the coarseness of the ramp-up increments, which place initial production
above the optimum, permitting a steeper rate of decrease over the lifetime of the stock. As
the ramp-up increment is decreased, the error is reduced somewhat, but persists because of
the discrete time steps of the simulation.

The

∆πq /πq

curve in Figure 5.4 reveals that, for N=4, 5 and 6, the producers alter-
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Table 5.1: Comparison of the computational agent models and the adaptive agent models
(∆πq /πq values are multiplied by 10,000).
adaptive

agent models

agent models

Πtotal

∆πq /πq

Πtotal

∆πq /πq

358.53

2.61

358.53

2.61

N
Theoretical optimum

computational

Monopoly

1

358.07

2.61

357.82

3.04

Oligopoly

2

306.31

5.22

313.16

2.82

Oligopoly

3

265.42

7.83

283.17

2.71

Oligopoly

4

232.72

10.43

258.51

1.83

Oligopoly

5

206.23

13.04

240.41

1.86

Oligopoly

6

184.51

15.65

225.36

1.89

nated between the decreasing strategy and the constant production strategy for the rst
approximately 100 days.

For the monopoly producer, total discounted prot is within a

few hundredths of a percent of the optimum 358.53.
and percent change in marginal prot

∆πq /πq

Table 5.1 compares the total prot

for the computational agent model and the

adaptive agent model. Note that, for N=6, the computational agent model achieves only 51
percent of optimal prot, whereas the adaptive agent model captures nearly 63 percent of
optimal prot.

These models illustrate that it is less costly to mistakenly assume monopoly market power
under heuristic optimization than when applying Hotelling's Rule explicitly. No real-world
producer is likely to be unaware of competitors. Rather, these models serve as a worst case
proxy for errors in assumptions about market structure in general. The simulation artifacts in
the adaptive agent model are not unlike errors that are likely to happen in reality. Real-world
production planners may be subject to uncertainty in stock or interest rates. or stickiness
in wages or prices.
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5.2.1 A pooled-stock oligopoly model
For the adaptive agent models in Section 5.2, each producer agent is endowed with
initial stock. For example, the total stock in the N=6 model is

6x0 .

For the models in this

section, the total stock is constant as the number of producers increases.
each producer begins with a stock of
with a stock of

x0 /10.

x0 /2,

x0

For a duopoly,

and with ten producers, each producer begins

This model is slightly dierent from the previous in two ways. First,

the ramp-up increment is divided by the number of producers, and second, initial stock
levels are given a small random variation. The ramp-up increment is scaled because, with an
initial stock of

x0

the default increment of 0.01 is small compared with the optimal starting

production level of 0.1022. For an initial stock of

x0 /5, however, an increment of 0.01 is large

compared with the starting production level of approximately 0.01. The random variation is
introduced to avoid any artifacts due the ratio between total stock and ramp-up increment.

The adaptive agent duopoly production path in Figure 5.5 reects a collusion-like outcome, as do models for N=3 and N=4. That is, the adaptive producer agents arrive at a
collusive market structure using only the optimization heuristic.

For an oligopoly of ve

producers, however, something completely dierent occurs, as seen in Figure 5.5.

In this

model, after the ramp-up phase, some producers begin reducing production while others
continue unchanged.

This behavior is an emergent property of the heuristic. Initially, the total stock of 100 is
distributed among the ve producers in near equal amounts, with small random deviations.
In this model, the initial stock allocations are 20.11, 20.09, 19.90, 19.88, and 20.02 for
Firm 1 through 5, respectively. These sum to 100, as in all the pooled-stock models. The
ve rms begin the ramp-up phases together, and all ve reach the optimal production
path aver 53 iterations.

At this point, Firms 1 and 2, with the largest allocations, select

a decreasing strategy, while the rest of the rms select zero change strategies.

That an

individual producer chooses a at production strategy is not unexpected, as shown by the
small steps at the beginning of the percent change in marginal prot curves in Figure 5.4.
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This shows that the estimate of total prot is sensitive to small dierences in total reserves
for this particular disitribution of stocks. The smaller producers nd the level production
path optimal because the decreases in production by the two largest producers cause price
increases that are sucient for the remaining producers to estimate increasing prots at
constant production levels.

That is, Firms 3, 4, and 5 are self-optimizing to higher total

production than the collusive outcome (as per Cournot-Nash equilibrium) by maintaining
constant production levels while Firms 1 and 2 decrease theirs.

The results for adaptive agent models with from one to ten producers are shown in Figure
5.6. For a single producer, this model is eectively identical to the monopoly producer in
Figure 5.4. As the number of rms increases, the production paths present evidence of what
Hotelling calls the retardation of production under monopoly (Hotelling, 1931, sec. 7) in
that the lifetime of the stock decreases as the number of producers increases. The models with
ve, seven and ten producers show the Cournot outcome, while the rest show the collusion
outcome. All of these models appear to reach the theoretically optimal prot. These models
show that total collusion-level prots are not necessarily and indicator of collusion.

Note

also, in Figure 5.6, the discontinuities in the percent change in marginal prot curves where
producers change strategies at the end stock life.

5.2.2 Accuracy and precision of the heuristic
The artifacts discussed in the preceding two sections beg the question of errors in the
heuristic ramp-up and their impact on total prot. Figure 5.1 shows the simulation results
from fty Monte Carlo samples of the adaptive agent monopoly model. For each simulation,
the fth ramp-up increase was given a small adjustment

 ∼ N (0, 0.00001).

The left-hand

plot shows the relationship between optimal initial production level and total prot. The
upper curve represents samples which reached the ramp-up cuto on the ninth day, the lower
curve on the tenth day. The lower curve is essentially an extension of the upper: at the far
right-hand side of the upper curve, it is no longer optimal to end ramp-up on the ninth
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Figure 5.1: Monte Carlo samples of heuristic outcomes.

day, so the next increment is to end ramp-up on the tenth day at the far left-hand end of
the lower curve. The day on which ramp-up ends aects total prot in that the fewer days
lost to non-optimum ramp-up production levels, the higher the total prot. The curves end
abruptly at the low end because any lower sample ended ramp-up on the previous day. The
right hand plot shows the relationship between percent change in marginal prot and total
prot. The distribution of points is nearly identical, reecting a nearly linear relationship
between initial production level and the percent change in marginal prot. From Hotelling's
Rule, maximum prot should occur for an initial production level of 0.1022 and a percent
change in marginal prot of 0.000261.

The curves peak very near these values.

The key

outcome of these plots is that the distributed error in the heuristic initial production level
results in a error range of 0.45 out of about 358, or less than 0.14 percent.

Figure 5.1 also illustrates the impact of error in the estimate of
(3.29), a one percent error in

q0 ,

x0

x0 .

According to equation

translates into a one-half percent error in initial production

and from equation (3.32), that, in turn, translates into an error of 0.84 percent in the

theoretical maximum prot. For the heuristic, however, Figure 5.1 shows a 10 percent error
in

q0

leading to a 0.11 percent error in total prot. This is almost two orders of magnitude

less impact than theory predicts. The heuristic lessens the impact on total prot from an
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underestimate of the stock by making Bayesian updates to the production level in each
time-step.

5.3 A collusion model
The collusion model is an extension of the pooled-stock model in Section 5.2.1. This is
the only one in which the producer agents communicate with each other. The initial stock is
divided among the producers with small random uctuations, as discussed in Section 5.2.1.
The producer with the greatest stock is considered the market leader. The market leader
has the same behaviors as the producers in Section 5.2.1, assuming that it is in a monopoly
market. At the point in a time-step when the producers decide on a production level (see
Figure 4.1), all the follower producers mimic the leader's production changes, scaled by their
relative stock levels. See Figure 5.7.

This model does not address issues associated with cheating in a collusive market, but
cheating is a simple extension of the current model. The ability for producers to cheat would
be introduced at the point of the calculation to scale the leader's production changes. For
a cheating follower, this could be a small increase above the scaled production share. For
a cheating leader, it would be a matter of the leader communicating one production level
change and implementing another.

5.4 Nonzero-cost models
Three cost functions are examined: a xed (per day) cost, a marginal (per unit) cost, and
a stock (cumulative production) cost. The possibility that cost may exceed revenue imposes
the following expansions of the behavioral rules (changes in italic):

1. In the ramp-up phase, increase the production level from zero until estimated total
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prot is positive and begins to decrease.

2. In the optimization phase, in each period, estimate future prot based on the three production strategies, then execute the strategy that maximizes future prot. Production

ceases if prot becomes negative.

For the xed cost and marginal cost models, the non-negative prot restriction only comes
into play when cost exceeds any feasible level of revenue, in which case the ramp-up phase
ends with negative prot and the simulation terminates.

In stock cost models, however,

cost increases over time, and may exceed any feasible level of revenue before the stock is
physically depleted. This is explored further in the section on the stock cost model.

For the inverse demand function in Section 3.2 there are no closed-form optimal control
solutions when marginal or cumulative costs are included.

The adaptive agent heuristic,

however, considers only per period prot, marginal prot and marginal price. Qualitatively,
Monte Carlo sampling should show a trend toward the costless behavior as cost decreases.
That is, for the xed and marginal cost models, percent change in marginal prot should
approach equation (3.14).

For the stock cost models, percent change in marginal prot

should approach equation (3.13).

5.4.1 Fixed cost model
The xed cost model is the pooled-stock adaptive agent model with a xed cost

N (0.012, 0.0016) truncated such that c0 ≥ 0.
such that

±3σ = 0.24

c0 ∼

The mean and standard deviation were chosen

spans the revenue range of the heuristic's rst six ramp-up iterations

based on equation (3.19), which is now revenue rather than prot.

Time-series plots for

fty Monte Carlo monopoly simulations are shown in Figure 5.8. For many of the samples,
the heuristic selects the at production level strategy, resulting in a zero percent change
in marginal prot until the nal few time-steps. In other samples, the heuristic selects the
decreasing strategy followed by a at strategy, resulting in percent change in marginal prot
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curves that sweep upward then fall to zero. The diamonds in the percent change in marginal
prot plot indicate sharp spikes (to several hundreds on the scaled y-axis), indicating that
the heuristic selects a rapid taper down to zero production over the nal two or three timesteps as stock reaches physical depletion. Note that optimal percent change in marginal cost
is 2.6 in this graph.

The heavy dashed line in the production path plot indicates theoretical

qmin from equation

(3.33). This is the envelope for optimal terminal production levels.

The results of the Monte Carlo monopoly simulations are summarized in Figure 5.11.
Note that the results cluster based on the heuristic

qmin ,

and that

qmin

0.01. This is because 0.01 is the default ramp-up production change and

is in multiples of

qmin

is recorded by

the heuristic during the ramp-up phase. The inset graph compares the heuristic values for

qmin

with the theoretical values from (3.33). The graphs show a distinct trend in percent

change in marginal prot with regard to xed cost.

The dashed lines are the theoretical

values discussed in Section 3.4.

5.4.2 Marginal cost model
The marginal cost model is the costless model with a constant marginal cost

N (1.0, 0.110889)

truncated such that

c1 ≥ 0.

c1 ∼

The time-series data for the marginal cost

model are shown in Figure 5.9. The plot shows only three unique production paths because
the initial value is weakly dependent on marginal cost, and the step size in the ramp-up
heuristic is much greater than the variations between starting production levels. The timeseries data also reveal that percent change in marginal prot is always close to the optimal
2.6, and trends toward it in the course of the simulation.

The results from fty Monte Carlo monopoly simulations are shown in Figure 5.12. In
these models, percent change in marginal prot is sensitive to the initial production level.
A percent change in marginal prot below optimum implies that the initial production level

Chapter 5.

The Hotelling Simulations

92

is too low, preventing the heuristic from optimally reducing production each time step.
Similarly, a percent change in marginal prot above optimum implies an initial production
level that is too high. In all cases, the percent change in marginal prot trends downward.

5.4.3 Stock cost model
The stock cost model is the adaptive agent model with pooled stock.

In this model,

the optimum production path can be either decreasing or increasing over time, depending
on the value of the stock cost parameter

c2 .

Also, for higher values of

c2

it is expected

that production will stop before the stock is physically depleted. These characteristics are
discussed in Section 3.6.

Before Monte Carlo sampling the parameter space, it is instructive examine the classes
of behavior anticipated. Figure 5.10 shows a time-series plot for ve representative values
of stock cost.

The stock cost parameter

c2

is shown as sc in the legend.

The zero cost

model is included for comparison and is identical to the costless monopoly model in Section
5.2.1. The model with

c2 = 0.001

costless model. The model with

is included to show the deviation of a small cost from the

c2 = 0.005

is included to show the behavior in the vicinity

of transition from decreasing production to increasing production discussed in Section 3.6 in
the discussion of Figure 3.4. The model with

c2 = 0.010

is

1/x0 ,

which is the cost at which

the producer will begin to leave some of the stock unproduced as discussed in Section 3.6,
and the model with

c2 = 0.013

is included to show the behavior well into the regime for

which the physical stock is greater than zero when production stops.

Interesting to note here is that, for small stock cost (much less than 0.10) or large stock
cost (signicantly greater than 0.10), the production paths are fairly smooth. In the vicinity
of 0.10, however, the heuristic makes frequent changes resulting in a highly volatile percent
change in marginal prot.

The percent change in marginal cost plot has been smoothed

with a boxcar length of 100 days. Note also that, for smaller stock costs, the percent change
in marginal prot turns toward negative innity very quickly, and, at least for 0.005, and
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then comes down from positive innity thereafter. This arises because, in this period, the
production level is very close to the zero marginal prot regime.

Marginal prot appears

in the denominator of percent change in marginal prot, hence the switch between negative
and positive innity as marginal prot crosses through zero.

Figure Figure (5.13) shows the outcome space results from 50 Monte Carlo samples with
stock cost taken from

c2 ∼ N (0.01, 0.000016),

truncated such that

c2 ≥ 0.

Very little can

be drawn from the percent change in marginal prot plot other than to note, as in the timeseries plot, that percent change in marginal prot can be highly dynamic. The prot and
user cost plot shows that the heuristic is near optimal at zero stock cost and when stock
cost is 0.10.

The error in the heuristic is especially large in the range between zero and

0.10. The initial production level plot provides a clue as to why: initial production levels
are consistently too high, resulting in lower prots and an ineciently rapid reduction in
stock. Finally, the upper right plot shows the consequences: a much shortened lifetime for
stock costs below 0.10, and too much stock left unexploited for stock costs above 0.10. The
dashed lines are the theoretical values, as discussed in Section 3.6.

5.5 Theoretical eciency
To put the foregoing results into perspective, Figure 5.2 shows the eect of error on the
theoretical costless model. These are families of curves of total net prot from the theoretical
costless monopoly model in Section (3.3). The initial production level

q0

is varied plus or

minus 15 percent about the optimum of 0.1022. The production path slope is also varied so
that percent change in marginal prot varies plus or minus 15 percent about the optimum
of

2.61 × 10−4 .
The widely spaced diagonal lines (on the left in the left gure, on the right in the right

gure) result from the initial production level being so low that the downward slope of the
production path reduces production to zero before the stock is physically depleted.

This
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represents a gross error in production planning and not one likely to be seen in real-world
applications.
The closely spaced nearly horizontal lines in both gures (on the right in the left gure,
on the left in the right gure) represent the performance of the Hotelling Rule optimal
production path under slight deviations in

q0

and

∆πq /πq .

The inverted triangles point to

the optimal control solution. The close spacing of these lines is an indication that, even for
the theoretical solution, there is only a small penalty for small errors in initial production or
the slope in the production path. That is, although Hotelling's Rule is the optimum, total
discounted prots are only weakly aected from small deviations from Hotelling's Rule.
There is less than one percent error in prot for errors of plus on minus twenty percent in
initial production and plus or minus ten percent in percent change in marginal prot.

Figure 5.2: Errors in the computational agent model.
The optimal initial production level and optimal
gle.

π̇q /πq

are indicated with an inverted trian-

Figure 5.3: Computational agent models - time-series. See the discussion in Section 4.5.
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Figure 5.4: Adaptive identical stock models - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.5: Adaptive agent pooled stock models - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.2.1.
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Figure 5.6: Adaptive agent conserved stock models - 10 producers. See the caption on Figure 5.5 and Section 5.2.1.
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Figure 5.7: Collusion model - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.3.
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Figure 5.8: Fixed cost model - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.4.1.
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Figure 5.9: Marginal cost model - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.10: Stock cost model - time-series. See the discussion in Section 5.4.3.
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Figure 5.11: The xed cost model - outcome space.
In the upper-left plot, the dashed line indicates optimum percent change in marginal prot.
The arrows indicate the movement of the percent change in marginal prot during the
simulation. The numbers below groups of arrows indicate the day number when the
ramp-up phase was completed. The symbols reect the heuristic value of
sample. The symbols correspond to values of

qmin

qmin

for each

which are shown in the legend. The inset

graph compares simulation stock lifetimes (dots) with theoretical (dashed line).
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Figure 5.12: Marginal cost model - outcome space.
Marginal cost models (constant unit cost). The arrows depict the trajectory in the course
of the simulation, starting at the X and ending at the arrowhead. The dashed lines indicate
the theoretical optima.
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Figure 5.13: Stock cost model - outcome space.
The arrows depict the percent change in marginal prot trajectory in the course of the
simulation, starting at the symbol and ending at the arrowhead. Note that y-values on this
graph are 10,000 times those of the others. The inset plots stock lifetime and ending stock
level versus marginal cost of stock.
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Chapter 6

Analysis of the Simulation Results

The mathematical models for Hotelling's Rule are presented in Chapter 3. The corresponding ABMs are described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the simulation results and
their characteristics. This chapter will attempt to tie together the mathematical models, the
ABMs and the simulation results.

The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 shows that Hotelling's Rule - increasing
percent change in marginal prot by r-percent each period - is incontrovertibly the production
path to maximize present value prot given the assumptions of the model. The import of
those assumptions is, ultimately, the subject of the ABM results in Chapter 5. In general,
however, it is observed in the ABM results that the returns on eort to optimize are small,
as discussed in Section 5.5, which is pursued further in Section 6.1. That is, although the
r-percent rule is the very best strategy to maximize prot, other strategies may produce
results that look as good from a reasonable distance. Support for this observation is given
in the following sections discussing the individual models.

The ABM optimizing heuristic is described in detail in Section 4.3, but it can be summarized in the following way. The program makes a day-by-day decision to continue, increase,
or reduce the production level based on a simple estimate of total prot. The only knowledge
of how the market will react to those changes is an estimate based on previous days: how
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much the price went down when production was increased, and vice versa. A heuristic is
often referred to as a rule of thumb. Heuristics can be very sophisticated, but this one is
not.

However, as the results show, it doesn't need to be.

The results consistently show,

however, an artifact - or ngerprint - of the heuristic. Because production changes are made
in steps rather than continuously, the heuristic typically nds production paths that are
not-quite-optimal. This characteristic is used to examine the sensitivity of the outcome to
the step size.

6.1 The ecacy of the heuristic
The inverse demand function in Section 3.2 is the basic demand function used by Hotelling
to demonstrate the r-percent rule for an optimizing monopolist. As a costless model it is
appealing because the prot (3.19) and marginal prot (3.20) functions are straightforward
to derive and simple to manipulate.
the full market demand.

There is no static optimum for a monopolist facing

That is, there is no nite optimal production path without the

constraints imposed in dynamic optimization.

The solution to the dynamic constraint

m(t)

in (3.23) is called the shadow price.

It

represents the price (or opportunity cost) of the next unit to be extracted (or which would
be extracted if one remained, in the case of completely exhausted stock).
resource, the shadow price is often called the user cost.

For a natural

The shadow price and optimal

production level are inversely linked: in the optimal solution for the costless model, as the
stock is exhausted, the shadow price edges up to the choke price, which pushes the optimal
production level down toward zero. For all but some of the stock cost models, production
level and shadow price each reach their nal value just as the stock is depleted.

For reasons explained in Chapter 2, the percent change in marginal prot is the central
characteristic of interest in the Hotelling models. The simulation results presented in Chapter
5, however, reveal that the optimizing producer behaviors outlined by Hotelling are far more
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important than the r-percent outcome. The evidence for this is presented in the following
paragraphs.
For the costless monopoly model, the optimal production level decreases at a constant
rate, which is

r/K , the discount rate divided by the choke price.

Consider only the monopoly

outcome, the thin solid line in Figure 5.4, and the Hotelling's Rule theoretical optimum,
which is the thick solid line. The ABM production path starts slightly higher and is a little
steeper than optimum.

Because of the size of the increments in the ramp-up phase, the

heuristic will not, in general, exactly match the optimal production path. The eect on total
producer prot (or user cost) is very slight - the thinner ABM curve in the bottom plot of
Figure 5.4 is barely distinguishable from the thick Hotelling optimum.
The steeper production path selected by the heuristic results in a higher percent change
in marginal prot,

1

as illustrated in the third plot of Figure 5.4. Note that although there is

only a slight dierence between the heuristic and Hotelling in the production path, resulting
in a nearly imperceptibly lower producer prot, the percent change in marginal prot for
the heuristic is nearly 20 percent higher.

This is the rst evidence that a deviation from

Hotelling's Rule of the percent change in marginal prot is not a reliable indicator that a
producer is not operating optimally.
While it is correct to say that the error introduced by the size of production increments is
an artifact of simulation, it also reects the kinds of errors made in real-world production. A
production planner will have incomplete or uncertain information on the demand function,
future discount rates, and the extent of the resource. Additionally, factor inputs or output
requirements may be sticky - they can't be changed innitesimally or on short notice.
To understand how well the heuristic performs in the absence of these artifacts, examine
Figure 5.1. For this plot, the basic heuristic is not changed - the increments are still large but the base value is nudged by a small amount that is randomly distributed. This means

1 The

percent change in marginal prot is labeled ∆πq /πq in the graph as a reminder that this

is calculated from discrete changes in the simulation and is not a dierential with respect to time.
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that, within 50 Monte Carlo samples, some production paths are likely to be nearly identical
to the Hotelling's Rule path, and others o by more than the error previously described in
Figure 5.4. The samples in which the initial production level are closest to the theoretical
optimum of 0.1022 result in the highest producer prot in Figure 5.1. That peak corresponds
to a percent change in marginal prot of 0.000261, also the theoretical optimum.

6.2 The penalty for mistaking the number of competitors
The theoretical Hotelling's Rule curves in in the adaptive agent model shown in Figure 5.4
are identical to the monopoly curves in the computational agent models in Figure 5.3. Aside
from the monopoly ABM curve in 5.4, the remaining curves are generated from models with
more than one producer. In both gures, the computational agent model and the adaptive
agent model, these curves reect the behavior of producers who behave as though it is a
monopoly market even though it is not.
reducing the production level by

r/K

For the computational agent model, that means

each period. For the adaptive agent model, it means

a producer assumes that only its change in production results in observed price changes.

Table 5.1 makes it clear that the error of assuming a monopoly market when there are
competitors is more costly in the computational agent model.

With six competitors, the

monopoly assumption reduces total prot by about 18 percent.

The percent change in

marginal prot for the adaptive agent model is between 0.0002 and 0.0003, while for the
computational agent model it ranges from 0.00261 to nearly 0.0015. The adaptive behavior
of the heuristic is able to compensate somewhat for a mistake in assuming the size of the
market.

While it is not likely that a real-world producer will mistakenly assume a monopoly
market, errors in assumptions about the market structure are likely. These plots quantify
the worst case consequences of an error in estimating market structure. It is also evident
that daily Bayesian updates by the heuristic can compensate somewhat for the error.
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6.3 The emergent oligopoly models
The theory of oligopoly models is described qualitatively in Section 3.7. Three dierent
approaches to an oligopoly market are taken in the ABMs: adaptive with identical stock,
adaptive with conserved stock, and adaptive collusion.

In the adaptive identical stock model, each producer treats the market as though it were
a monopoly, and each producer has an initial stock of 100. That is, for the duopoly model,
the total market stock is 200, while the total stock is 500 for ve producers.

This model

is discussed in the Sections 6.1 and 6.2, and serves primarily as a comparison with the
computational agent model in Figure 5.3. In the computational agent model, each producer
also assumes a monopoly and blindly follows Hotelling's Rule by reducing production by

r/K

each period, which is why all production paths overlap in the top plot of Figure 5.3. Because
total production increases with the number of producers, however, prices are lower as the
number of producers increases, as seen in the second plot. For
in total production per day is

N

producers, the reduction

N r/K , so percent change in marginal prot increases with the

number of producers, as seen in the third plot. Finally, the bottom plot shows that prot per
producer decreases as the number of producers increases. By comparison, Figure 5.4 shows
that the heuristic in the adaptive identical stock model is able to adjust somewhat, so that
percent change in marginal prot does not scale by the number of producers, as seen in the
plot, and prot per producer is not quite as low as for the computational agent model. As
discussed in Section 6.2, the mistake of assuming monopoly powers in an oligopoly market
is costly if one optimizes analytically, but much less so if one optimizes heuristically.

In order to make a direct comparison between the production paths of monopoly and
oligopoly markets, the adaptive conserved-stock model maintains a total market stock of 100
that is divided roughly equally among the producers. Thus, in the duopoly, each producer
begins with a stock of approximately 50, while in the ve-producer model the initial stock
is about 20 for each producer.

The division of initial stock is given a very small random

variation so that the individual producers are distinguishable. This model led to two dierent
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outcomes, depending on the number of producers. This is reected in two dierent curve
shapes in the upper plot of Figure 5.5, which shows individual outputs for an oligopoly of ve
producers. The nearly identical diagonal lines give the appearance that some producers are
colluding to share monopoly prots. The other curves, however, show that some producers
elected to maintain nearly constant production levels until their stocks where physically
depleted.

Figure 5.6 shows that this is not unique for ve producers, it is also seen with

seven and with ten producers. Each of these outcomes is surprising.Figure 5.6 shows that,
for ve, seven and ten producers.

The collusive outcome is surprising because of the simple nature of the heuristic. The
producers don't communicate and, therefore, cannot collude. The only evidence one producer
has that there are others is in the observed marginal price. That is, a producer assumes that
its own change in production is solely responsible for any change in price. This results in a
distorted sense of the demand function which leads to the monopoly outcome only because
all of the producers are making the same decisions at the same time.

The non-collusion outcome is the unanticipated consequence of the randomized distribution of stock levels. The producers with the largest stock reach the time to begin reducing
production before the smaller producers.

This happens because the target reduction rate

(4.10) is inversely proportional to current stock level.

The protable production level is

slightly lower for higher stock levels. For some divisions of the total stock, that small dierence is enough to let the larger producers switch from the ramp-up phase to the optimizing
phase one time step sooner than the the smaller producers.

When the larger producers begin reducing their production levels, this causes an increase
in the market price, so the smaller producers see an increase in their prot without reducing
their own production levels. This only occurs in the models for ve, seven and ten producers,
in which the variation in initial stock levels was great enough to lead to a timing dierence
among producers. The drop at about Day 1000 is when the producers that did not reduce
their production levels physically depleted their stocks.
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There are three things that suggest that this is a Cournot-Nash outcome:

1. The producers optimize production levels based on the production decisions of others

2. Once the producers have elected their strategies, for producers that decide to decrease
production, changing to a strategy of level production would reduce estimated prots.
For the producers that decide not to change production, decreasing production would
reduce estimated prots.

In this way, a given distribution of strategies is a Nash

equilibrium.

3. Total production is greater than for a monopoly or collusion market, but less than
perfect competition.

Similarly, total prot is less than a monopoly, but more than

perfect competition.

6.4 Overt collusion is indistinguishable from optimization
In contrast to the preceding model, in the collusion model the producers do communicate.
This model also distributes the total stock evenly but with random variations. The producer
with the largest stock is then considered the market leader (see Section 5.3). The market
leader optimizes using the heuristic, and all the rest of the producers do whatever the leader
does, scaled by their relative stock levels. That is, if the leader lowers production by 0.01,
another producer with a stock that is 90 percent of the leader's will lower production by
0.009. This approach results in lock-step production identical to a monopoly as shown in
Figure 5.7. Again, the heuristic tends to nd an initial production level slightly higher than
theoretically optimal (the thick line in Figure 5.7) resulting in a production path slightly
steeper than optimal.

Qualitatively, the overt collusion production path in Figure 5.7 is

indistinguishable from the collusion-like outcomes (the unbroken diagonal lines) in Figure
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Figure 5.6. Based on production path alone, it is not possible to discern intentional collusion
from summed individual prot maximization.

6.5 The nonzero cost models
The performance of the ABM heuristic in the face of nonzero costs varies widely based on
the cost structure. For a xed cost, the accuracy of the heuristic is very close to Hotelling's
Rule. For a marginal cost, the heuristic has decreasing accuracy with increasing cost. For
the stock cost model, the accuracy varies considerably over the cost range.

6.5.1 The xed cost model
For the xed cost model, the theoretically optimal production path (3.35) decreases
continuously from

q(0)

to

qT .

The xed cost model has an ending production level

qT

that

increases with cost. If the cost is greater than zero, the production level must not go to zero,
as this will result in negative prot, as discussed in Section 3.4. The time-series plot of the
xed cost model in Figure 5.8 shows that the heuristic tends to decrease too rapidly, then
level o at

qT .

For this reason, as the upper-left plot in Figure 5.11 shows, percent change

in marginal prot values start lower than Hotelling's Rule and trend to well above it. Even
so, total prot is within one percent of the theoretical given a level of xed price, as seen in
the lower-left plot in Figure 5.11.

What is clear from the production paths in the top-right plot in Figure 5.11 is that a xed
cost accelerates the depletion of the stock. This is intuitive: for a per period cost, the total
cost is less if the stock is depleted more quickly. This shows that a producer that is simply
maximizing prot will achieve nearly optimal prot in the face of a xed cost. Consumers
will see the same user costs, but over a shorter period of time, as the lifetime of the resource
is reduced as xed costs increase.

Chapter 6.

Analysis of the Simulation Results

114

6.5.2 The marginal cost model
The production path for the marginal cost model (3.43) ranges from at, when
to decreasing with the same slope as the costless model,

−r/K ,

c1 = K ,

when the cost is zero. The

production paths in the plot at the top of Figure 5.12 appear to be too steep, resulting in
percent change in marginal prot values somewhat higher than Hotelling's Rule, as seen
in the middle plot in Figure 5.12. This is borne out by the upper-left plot in Figure 5.12,
showing that starting percent change in marginal prot values ranging from less than 0.00030
to as high as 0.00040. All of them trend downward toward the optimum of 0.00026 in the
course of simulation. The clusters in these curves are an artifact of the large ramp-up that
set initial production in multiples of 0.01. This is seen in the lower-right plot in Figure 5.12,
where the staring production levels fall into to groups, with the least cost sample in each
group at the top, near the optimum. This error, which contributes to the error in the slope
of the production path, leads to decreasing accuracy with increasing cost, as seen in the
lower-left plot in Figure 5.12. The error appears linear, at a rate of about ve percent per
unit marginal cost.

The upper-right plot in Figure 5.12 shows that the lifetime of the stock is extended
by a marginal cost, as anticipated from microeconomic equilibrium theory. This plot also
shows that the lowest cost sample from each cluster for a given initial production level is the
most accurate. This shows that a producer that is simply maximizing prot will forgo some
prot as marginal costs increase, beneting consumers with slightly lower user costs and a
prolonged resource lifetime.

6.5.3 The stock cost model
The production paths in the top plot of Figure 5.10 are an illustration of the complexity
of this cost model compared with the xed cost and marginal cost models. The zero cost plot
is a monotonically descending curve, identical to the costless production path, as it should

Chapter 6.

Analysis of the Simulation Results

115

be. A small stock cost, 0.001, produces the solid curve, which starts downward, then bows
up, nally curving rapidly downward to zero as the stock is depleted. The remaining paths
curve upward monotonically and end abruptly: these are the production paths for which
stock cost eventually equals revenue. In theory, these production paths are seen for costs of
0.01 or greater, yet here it appears for a stock cost of 0.005. The reason for this is found in
the upper-right plot in Figure 5.13. Note that for 50 on the cost axis (corresponding to a
stock cost of 0.005), the stock lifetime is well below optimum, yet the stock is fully depleted.
It appears that the heuristic treats this like a case where cost will eventually exceed revenue,
keeping the production level high until the stock is depleted. The upper-left plot in Figure
5.13 shows that percent change in marginal prot starts large and negative (note that the
scale of this plot is 10,000 times greater than in the preceding cost models). This means that
production starts out increasing at a rapid rate (driving percent change in marginal prot
downward at a rapid rate). Then, as the stock is depleted, the percent change in marginal
prot becomes large and positive (at the arrow head) as the production level curves rapidly
downward. The lower-right plot in Figure 5.13 shows that, in addition to production being
ineciently high, initial production levels start out well above theoretical optimum as well.

The middle plot in Figure 5.10 shows that the heuristic oscillates rapidly between increasing and decreasing production when the stock cost is 0.001. Note that these curves are
smoothed over 100 periods. The actual excursions in percent change in marginal prot are
orders of magnitude greater than they appear here. This is the cost at which the optimal
production path begins leaving some of the stock behind, as seen in the middle plot of Figure
3.4.

The smoothness of the curves resembling an upper case letter "D" at other costs is
also the result of smoothing. These curves show evidence that the production path crosses
over from negative marginal prot to positive marginal prot. Marginal prot appears as
the denominator in percent change in marginal prot, which goes toward negative innity as
marginal prot approaches zero from the negative side, then percent change in marginal prot
decreases from innity as marginal prot moves away from zero in the positive direction.
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This is evidenced by the 0.005 curve between days 310 and 400. Note that this cost is close
to the cost at which

m(0)

and

mT

cross in the top plot in Figure 3.4, which is the cost at

which the optimal production path goes from downward sloping to upward sloping.

The dynamics of these plots reveal an inaccuracy of the coarse strategies available to
the heuristic.

When the optimal production path is nearly at, as with a cost of 0.001,

the heuristic switches rapidly between stationary, decreasing and increasing strategies. The
coarse strategies lead to ineciently high production levels at costs below 0.01, and to an
error in terminating too early for costs above 0.01, as seen by the

T

plot in Figure 5.13.

The latter is a threading-the-needle problem: as stock cost rises toward revenue limits, the
heuristic has a narrowing range over which to adjust strategies. One error can result in a
negative marginal prot for a period, which is sucient to terminate production, as per the
modied Rule 2 in Section 5.4.

This should not be viewed as strictly a computational limitation of this heuristic. Real
production levels are sticky : they cannot be varied innitesimally because of labor, transportation, sales, and other constraints. A human mine operator may realize that a minor
adjustment to the production plan will move marginal prot back into the black, but only
for a short time, as this is end of life for this resource. Or, the mine operator may be under
corporate restrictions that make that determination irrelevant.

One feature of interest in this model is the performance of the heuristic at a stock cost of
0.01. This is the stock cost at which stock cost equals revenue just as the stock is depleted.
It is also, as evidenced by the plots in Figure 5.13, the nonzero stock cost for which the
heuristic is most accurate. This is the only stock cost for which stock lifetime, ending stock
level, and producer prot are all equivalent to the optimum. This is despite having an initial
production level that is much higher than optimum, as shown in the lower-right plot in
Figure 5.13.

All of the preceding discussion of heuristic errors aside, producer prot deviates by less
than ten percent at the worst. This is equivalent to a ten percent reduction in user cost, but
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at the cost of a nearly one-third reduction in the resource lifetime.

6.6 Summary
The latter models in Section 6.3 show that, in an oligopoly market with producers optimizing independently, the result is either collusion-like behavior, or Cournot-like behavior,
depending on the market structure. This implies that, in the absence of a smoking gun, a
collusive market outcome is not prima facie evidence of collusion in an oligopoly resource
market.
The nonzero cost models are xed cost, linear marginal cost, and linear stock cost. These
represent highly stylized production technologies, though they have real-world parallels. An
example of a xed cost is drilling water wells (Hsiao and Chang, 2002). An example linear
marginal cost is the transport of polutants (Conrad and Clark, 1987). Linear stock costs are
seen in some mineral production models (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2000).
For the nonzero cost models, the behavior of the independently optimizing producer is
qualitatively consistent with the Hotelling's Rule optimum. The performance of the adaptive
producer varies depending on cost structure, ranging from uniformly accurate under a xed
cost, a small inaccuracy that increases with cost for a marginal cost structure, and a widely
varying accuracy with a stock cost structure. Although lost producer prots translate into
reduced user costs, it is universally at the expense of foreshortening the resource lifetime.
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Chapter 7

Policy Implications

Whether privately or publicly held, nonrenewable resources impact public welfare and,
therefore, often come under public policy purview.

Those who formulate policy typically

have multiple and sometimes conicting goals. Of interest to policy-makers is the relative
eectiveness of the tools at their disposal given a natural resource, its ownership, and the
market in which it's traded.

Agent-based modeling is well suited to representing the disparate interests of resource
owners, consumers, taxpayers, politicians, environmentalists, regulators, and other parties
aected by or otherwise interested in nonrenewable resources. Although an ABM that fully
endogenizes all of these interests is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the simulation
results presented in Chapter 5 make it possible to explore an important consideration for
policy-makers: the unintended consequences of taxation.

Chapter 3 presents costs as a consequence of production technologies. Suppose, instead,
that those cost functions represent scal regimes:. E.g. the xed cost is a franchise tax, the
marginal cost is a severance tax, and the stock cost is an environmental restoration bond.
Given a set of stylized policy goals, which of these scal regimes best accomplishes those
goals? Which minimizes market distortion in the form of deadweight loss?
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Despite a highly simplistic optimization strategy, the ABM discussed in the preceding
chapters is eective at nding production paths that are optimum in terms of maximizing
producer prot. In Chapter 6 it is shown that some cost structures can result in a transfer of
producer prots to consumer surplus through lower user cost. If, in addition, the producer
cost is also tax revenue, the net impact of a tax on public welfare may be neutral or even
positive. The net impact depends on the denition of public welfare.

Optimality is in the eye of the beholder: what is optimal for a mine's holding company
may not be optimal in terms of public welfare. For the policy-maker interested in maximizing
public welfare, the preferred mechanism is to give the resource owner incentives to move the
production plan closer to the socially optimal path. The challenge for the policy-maker is
to eschew the unintended consequences that may arise from the unseen - and unseeable measures of optimality employed by the rm or rms in the regulated industry.

This chapter examines the simulation results in Chapter 5 in terms of net impact to
public welfare. The agent-based models are presented in Chapter 4. Despite a highly simplistic optimization strategy, the basic ABM is eective at nding production paths that are
optimum in terms of maximizing producer prot.

This is regarded as the baseline laissez

faire model with no taxation. Then, the cost structures considered in Chapters 3 and 4 are
viewed as taxes. The results discussed in Chapter 6 are revisited here to provide insights
into the impacts that can be expected from dierent scal regimes.

7.1 Policy objectives
Public economic policy concerns itself, generally, with social welfare - the well-being of
society as a whole. Natural resources certainly impact the economic components of consumer
and producer surplus. From a public policy point of view, social welfare often incorporates
more than economic surplus. For example, a mining industry may create negative externalities in the form of pollution. Often, public scal policies are intended to transfer some of
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the public cost of pollution - illness, peeled paint, etc. - to the producer with a Pigouvian
tax, thus internalizing that cost. In classic microeconomic equilibrium theory, the increased
cost of taxation results in a reduced equilibrium quantity, thereby also reducing the amount
of pollution produced.

This is not necessarily the outcome for a nonrenewable resource,

however.

Many nonrenewable natural resources are publicly owned. Mineral rights, for example,
are typically publicly owned and leased to private producers. In these cases, public policy
strives to balance current demand for the resource with the wellbeing of future generations
(Lecomber, 1979).

An important consideration introduced by Hotelling and revisited by

subsequent authors is that there is no reason to believe that society discounts the wellbeing of
future generations at the same rate that the producer discounts future prot. This represents
a signicant mismatch between optimality for the producer and the social optimum. For a
number of U.S. States, natural resources are a major source of public revenue (See Table
7.1). When big producer prots also mean big royalties, optimality for the producer may well
align with the social optimum. Public preferences vary over time, as will the productivity
of resource owners, so that public and private optima are likely to be in disequilibrium in
general, with only brief periods of concord.

The broad goal of nonrenewable resource policies is to align privately optimal resource
depletion with the social optimum (Burness, 1976). The policy mechanisms include sectorspecic rules, such as limitations and quotas, and taxation (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986).
This chapter will consider taxation as a policy tool to bring a resource owner's privately
optimal production path in line with the social optimum.

Considerations that may be included in the socially optimal production path include
forestalling resource depletion (Hotelling, 1931) and internalizing externalities (Dasgupta
and Heal, 1980, p. 52). Taxation as a policy tool is also a revenue source (Stiglitz, 2000, p.
718) and this is also a consideration in social optimality. These are discussed in the following
sections.
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7.1.1 Policies to forestall depletion
The Conservationists in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century promoted
the ecient development of nonrenewable resources, which typically meant slowing their
exploitation (Hotelling, 1931, Gaudet, 2007). Since that time, this has been a main theme
in U.S. natural resource policy, much of which includes government ownership of resources.
Implicit in this argument is that the welfare of future generations is no less important than the
current generation. That is, public welfare is not discounted. This is a concerned expressed
by Hotelling and reiterated by Solow, Krautkraemer, and Gaudet. The other argument of
the Conservationists is that competition for nonrenewable resources is wasteful, and point
also illustrated by Hotelling. That there are eciencies inherent in putting resources under a
single owner (Lecomber, 1979, p. 113) is used to support arguments for government control
of nonrenewable resources.
Much of the lexicon of the Conservation Movement appears in contemporary sustainability discussions. For example, the term future generations appears frequently in European

1

Union policy statements about sustainability .
It should be noted that policies to slow nonrenewable resource production are at odds
with other policies to protect or promote the industries that develop them. Many extractive industries are subject to government subsides that eectively accelerate the depletion
of nonrenewable resources. Extractive industries are also subsidized by government-funded
research, which reduces uncertainty and lowers development costs, thereby accelerating depletion(Lecomber, 1979, p. 119).

1 See,

for example, the position statements of the European Union on sustainable use of natural

resources, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/natres/ (accessed 25 February 2011)
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7.1.2 Policies to internalize externalities

The extraction and production of many nonrenewable resources leads to externalities
in the forms of air pollution, water pollution, scenic degradation, or other amenity effects(Hanley et al., 1997). Additionally, U.S. States that are resource rich may seek compensation for the exportation of those resource (Burness, 1976, p. 294). Policies to internalize
externalities are typically Pigouvian taxes (Dasgupta and Heal, 1980, p. 52). For unlimited
production, these taxes add to the cost of production, shifting the supply curve upward and
lowering the market-clearing equilibrium quantity. This is a textbook use of Pigouvian taxes
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005, Ch. 18). For a nonrenewable resource, however, taxes will
reduce rents, but will not necessarily reduce the equilibrium quantity, and may increase it.
This is the result with a xed tax rate, such as a franchise tax, which aects the producer's
optimal production path in the same was as the xed cost shown in Section 3.4.

Krautkraemer (1998) makes a distinction between ow externalities and stock externalities.

Flow externalities are those that arise because of the level of production, such as

air pollution.

Stock externalities are those that arise from the cumulative eects of pro-

duction, such as site degradation and atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases. Flow
externalities represent a per-unit social cost, while stock externalities represent a cumulative
production social cost. While it may appear appropriate that ow externalities be addressed
by marginal taxes and that stock externalities be addressed by cumulative production taxes,
the relative eciencies of these scal regimes indicate otherwise. It is shown in the following
sections that marginal taxation results in minimal market distortion while a cumulative production tax incurs a highly variable deadweight loss. When planning errors are taken into
consideration (see Section ?? for a discussion of error in this context), there are cumulative
production tax regimes that have both low deadweight loss and low vulnerability to planning
error. This is discussed in Section 7.3.
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Table 7.1: Natural resource taxes as revenue: states for which natural resource taxes constitute more than ten percent of total tax revenue.
State

Percent of total tax revenue

Alaska

77.3%

Wyoming

43.6%

North Dakota

34.3%

New Mexico

19.2%

Montana

14.5%

Oklahoma

13.1%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

7.1.3 Taxes as revenue
For all the justication that may have been given upon their introduction, governments
now rely on resource taxes and fees as a signicant and irreplaceable source of revenue.
Thirty-four U.S. States levy resource taxes, which make up nearly two percent of all state
tax revenues.

2

For the six states listed in Table 7.1, however, natural resource taxes consti-

tute more than ten percent of total tax revenue. Policy-makers in these states may nd it
dicult to balance the policy objectives of conservation and reduced externalities when such
a signicant fraction of tax revenue is at stake.

7.2 The agent-based models in the policy context
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the behavior of the simple ABM for xed costs, marginal costs,
and stock costs. In this chapter, those cost structures are viewed both as costs to the producer
and as revenue to the scal authority. This will provide a means to investigate the eciency
of the scal policies in terms of transferring producer surplus to social welfare, where social
welfare is composed of consumer surplus and tax revenue. The results in Chapters 5 and 6
are revisited here to provide insights into the impacts that can be expected from the scal
policy objectives discussed in Section 7.1.

2 From

the U.S. Census Bureau
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Tax policies are designed to use the market mechanism to align the owner's optimal
production path with the social optimum. An ABM of the scope described in the opening
section of this chapter would be required to examine the benets and drawbacks of restrictions and quotas, so this is not examined in this dissertation. What are examined are taxes
that impact prot in the form of xed costs, per-unit costs, royalties, or stock (cumulative
production) costs. The ABM results from each cost model are presented and discussed in
the policy context.

To recap the behavior of the ABM, in each production period, the agent has the choice to
reduce production, increase production, or maintain the current level. The amount by which
the agent can reduce production is limited to a reduction that will exactly exhaust the total
resource. The increment by which the agent can increase production is one percent. The
choice to reduce, increase or maintain production is based on a crude estimate of lifetime
income from the resource. Projected discounted future income is based on a rough estimate
of the demand function based on the intertemporal change in price.

7.2.1 The inverse demand function and its parameters
All of the ABMs discussed in the chapter come from Chapter 4, and they all use the
inverse demand function from Section 3.2. Similarly, the parameter values for all simulations
in this chapter are from Section 3.2. The graphs in the chapter can be compared directly,
and should be considered general results given the demand function.

7.2.2 Franchise taxes
A franchise tax is a xed cost incurred by the producer per day even if there is no
production. A mineral rights lease is an example of a franchise tax. The State of Idaho, for
example, auctions oil and gas leases for starting bids of $0.25 per acre, and the successful
bidder also pays $1.00 annual rental per acre. Idaho also assesses an additional $1.00 per
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acre annual penalty if the lease is not producing after six years.

3

The stylized xed cost monopoly model from Section 5.4.1 is used to simulate a franchise
tax. Figure 7.1 shows the result of 50 Monte Carlo simulations over xed tax rates distributed
over N(0.12, 0.0016).

This range provides samples from near costless to 0.20, the rate at

which the production path attens out. Higher tax rates result in more rapid depletion of
the resource, with the commensurate loss in total revenue. From the point of view of slowing
the rate of depletion, this policy is an abject failure. For the same reason, it fails as a means
to slow production to reduce a pollution externality.

It is also inecient at transferring

producer prot to tax revenue. This is evidenced by the downward slope of the total revenue
curve in the upper right-hand plot in 7.1, which represents increasing deadweight loss, as
presented in Section 7.3.

This is consistent with the ndings of Burness (1976, Table I).

Recall from the discussion in Chapter 5 that there is no signicant planning error with a
xed cost.

7.2.3 Unit severance taxes
Some U.S. States assess severance taxes based on the quantity of the resource extracted.
The State of Ohio, for example, assesses a tax of $0.10 per barrel for oil, $0.09 per ton for
coal, and $0.025 per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas.

4

Burness (1976, Table II) nds that

unit severance taxes will extend the resource lifetime in a competitive market, but have no
eect on a monopolist's output. Also, in a monopoly market, taxes are paid entirely from
producer prots.
The stylized marginal cost monopoly model from Section 5.4.2 is used to simulate a
severance tax. Figure 7.2 shows the result of 50 Monte Carlo simulations over unit tax rates
distributed over N(1.0, 0.110889). This range provides samples from near costless to 2.00

3 http://www.idl.idaho.gov/bureau/minerals/min_leasing/leasing.htm

2011)
4 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/5749 (accessed 21 February 2011)

(accessed 21 February

Chapter 7.

Policy Implications

126

per unit, which, at the optimal starting production level, is about 0.20 per period (similar
to the xed rate in the previous section).

In this model, the higher tax rate puts weak

upward pressure on the stock lifetime, while eciently transferring producer prot into tax
revenue. As a policy to prolong the lifetime of the resource, this is mildly successful. As a
means to lower production levels to reduce pollution externalities, it is not eective. It is an
ecient means to generate tax revenue, however. The weak eect on resource lifetime places
this outcome between the competitive and monopoly models of Burness. Deadweight loss,
implied by the slope of the total revenue curve, is small, especially considering that planning
error increases with the marginal tax rate (see Chapter 5).

7.2.4 Ad valorem taxes
Other U.S. States assess severance taxes based on the market value of the resource. The
State of New Mexico, for example, imposes an oil and natural gas tax of 3.75 percent of
assessed value based on the price received.

5

An ad valorem tax has the eect of increasing

the price in much the same way as a severance tax. Burness (1976) nds that an ad valorem
tax has the same eect as a unit tax.

7.2.5 Royalties
While an ad valorem tax is applied to revenue, a royalty is applied to net prot.

For

oil and gas produced in the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S. government collects royalty payments
ranging from 12 and a half percent for onshore and deep water wells (greater than 400 meters)
and 16 and two-thirds percent for shallow water wells.

6

The royalty cost model is not developed in Section 5.4.3, but the derivation is straight-

5 http://www.tax.newmexico.gov/All-Taxes/Pages/Oil-and-Gas-Production-Taxes.aspx

cessed 21 February 2011)
6 http://www.doi.gov/budget/2009/09Hilites/BH019.pdf (accessed 21 February 2011)

(ac-
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forward. Consider the Hamiltonian for ad valorem tax rate

ρ

H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m) = π (q (t) , x (t) , t) − ρπ (q (t) , x (t) , t) − m (t) q (t)

(7.1)

The production path is functionally identical to a costless model with a constant multiplier

1−ρ
H (q (t) , x (t) , t, m) = (1 − ρ) π (q (t) , x (t) , t) − m (t) q (t)
Tax revenue is total revenue times

ρ

and the optimal production path is identical to the

costless model for this demand function.
The royalty model is a modied version of the stylized costless monopoly model from
Section 5.2.1. The model is modied to compute a cost in each period that is a xed fraction
of revenue in the current period. This model is used to simulate the producer response to
a royalty tax. Figure 7.3 shows the result of 50 Monte Carlo simulations over royalty rates
distributed over N(0.1, 0.00110889). This range provides samples from near costless to a 20
percent tax rate. In this model, the tax rate has no eect on the stock lifetime, and eciently
transfers producer prot into tax revenue. Thus, as a policy to prolong the lifetime of the
resource or to lower production levels to reduce pollution externalities, it is not eective. It
is an ecient means to generate tax revenue. Here, again, planning errors are small.

7.2.6 Cumulative production fees/bonds/taxes
Cumulative production taxes might represent the costs of site cleanup and mitigation,
which increase as more earth is displaced or enhanced recovery techniques are employed.
Under some circumstances, this scal policy may resemble the reclamation bonds required
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (McDaniel, 1977). Heaps
(1985) nds that cumulative production taxation will result in higher rates of extraction but
over shorter periods of time, resulting in less total resource being extracted.
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The stylized stock cost monopoly model from Section 5.4.3 is used to simulate a cumulative production tax.

Figure 7.4 shows the result of 50 Monte Carlo simulations over

cumulative production tax rates distributed over N(0.005, 0.000009). This range provides
samples from near costless, to a cost that results in shutdown after producing only 50% of
the physical stock. There is a distinct kink in the curves at a tax rate of about

100 × 10−4

(the critical point). Below this rate, the agent is able to optimize normally. At the critical
point, future prots become negative, and the agent increases production until cost exceeds
revenue. At this point, the agent ceases production, even if there is remaining stock. The
stock remaining is shown in the upper right-hand graph. These results are consistent with
those of Heaps.

As a policy tool, cumulative production taxation increases the rate of depletion, as shown
by the rst downward section of the upper-left-hand graph (pre-critical-point). The transfer
of producer prot to tax revenue is highly inecient, particularly in the pre-critical-point
regime, as shown by the rapid drop in the total revenue curve. Much of the initial drop is
due to planning error. Similarly, there is increasing planning error above the critical point.
There is very little planning error at the critical point, though there is signicant deadweight
loss here.

7.3 The eciency of scal regimes
Figure 7.5 compares the eciency of the scal regimes in terms of the deadweight losses
they create, and the ecacy of the scal regimes in terms of slowing production and forestalling depletion. Deadweight loss in this case is presented as a fraction of the theoretical
maximum producer prot as determined from Hotelling's Rule for a costless monopoly producer found in Section 5.2.1. The formula is

DW Li,j = 1 −

Πij + Cij
Πmax
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where

DW Lij =

deadweight loss for policy

iand

Πij =

producer prot under policy

Cij =

total tax revenue under policy

Πmax =

rate

iat
i

j

rate

j

at rate

j

Hotelling's Rule maximum producer prot

The results from a simple optimizing agent-based model (ABM) indicate that cumulative
production taxation is largely counter-productive, while unit severance tax accomplishes
ecient transfer of prots to taxes and extends the life of a nonrenewable resource.

In

the case of pollution by-product externalities, the two-pronged goal of internalizing costs
and reducing excess supply is only achieved with unit severance taxes.
consistent with theoretical ndings (Heaps, 1985, Burness, 1976).

These results are
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Figure 7.1: Franchise taxes.
The per-period cost leads to accelerated depletion. Higher tax rates lead to higher levels of
production which, in turn, lead to lower total revenue. See the discussion in Section 7.2.2.
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Figure 7.2: Severance taxes.
Higher tax rates extend the lifetime of the stock slightly. Total revenue is conserved:
taxation is a direct transfer from the producer to the taxing authority. See the discussion
in Section 7.2.3.
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Figure 7.3: Royalties.
The rate is a fraction of total revenue. The lifetime of the stock is unaected, as is total
revenue. The tax is simply a transfer from the producer to the taxing authority. See the
discussion in Section 7.2.5.
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Figure 7.4: Cumulative taxation.
The tax is on cumulative production per period. The rate is multiplied by 10,000. The rate
of 100 is the point at which terminal cost equals terminal marginal revenue. At higher
cumulative production tax rates, some stock remains, being too costly to produce. See the
discussion in Section 7.2.6.
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Figure 7.5: Fiscal policy eciency and ecacy
Deadweight loss is expressed as a fraction of the maximum (Hotelling's Rule) producer
prot. The cumulative production tax regime is broken into physical depletion (no stock
remaining at the end) and non-depletion (the stock becomes too costly to produce and is
not exploited). See the discussion in Section 7.3.
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Chapter 8

Conclusions and Future Directions

Were this study to be distilled into a single graphic, it might be Figure 5.1. This gure
says that, for this model, Hotelling got it right, but that getting it wrong only costs 0.14
percent for the inverse demand function in Section 3.2.

In essence, this is saying that

constrained optimization yields the highest prot, but a crude approximation can come very
close to the optimum. If there is an information cost associated with computing the optimal
path, the resource owner may nd that the marginal benet is less than the marginal cost.
These results, as interesting as they may be, are not why this dissertation could be summed
up by Figure 5.1. This gure says three things: 1) the ABM results fall in a distribution
in the vicinity of the optimal path; 2) the mean of that distribution is very close to the
theoretical optimum; and 3) the distribution of errors in the ABM can be quantied from
this gure.

The importance of quantifying the performance of an ABM is central to the objectives
of this dissertation. This is the topic of Section 8.2.
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8.1 The rationale for agent-based modeling
The richness of agent-based modeling lies in the ability to assign to agents actions that
are expressed in ways similar to how real-world actors behave. It would be dicult to express, in mathematic terms, outcomes from a population of heterogeneous consumers whose
behaviors are based on a sequence of decisions relating to nonlinear individual preferences.
Constructing such an agent-based model, however, is straightforward. Furthermore, exploring deviations from the base behaviors may be a simple task in an ABM yet could require a
whole new mathematical model. Additionally, simulations of ABMs frequently reveal emergent outcomes - outcomes that are not a direct result of agent rules - while mathematical
models do not.

The ABMs in this dissertation are extremely simple by design. In addition to traditional
arguments for parsimony, the simplest model can be thought of as the worst case. If adding
sophistication improves the accuracy of the model, then the model may be that much closer
to reproducing the behavior of interest. If, alternatively, more sophisticated rules worsen the
accuracy, those rules are easily jettisoned.

8.2 Reaching the objectives
The three objectives of this dissertation were introduced in Chapter 1. They are 1) to
establish a framework for validation of an agent-based modeling approach to nonrenewable
resource production planning and analysis; 2) to use this framework to validate a simple
optimizing ABM; and 3) to explore any new aspects of the problem that are brought to light
by agent-based modeling. Each of these is discussed in the following sections.
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8.2.1 The ABM framework
The procedures outlined in the preceding Chapters can be easily extrapolated as a general
approach. In this way, it is a prototype for more rigorous validation of agent-based modeling
for nonrenewable resource production planning. The procedure outlined is to 1) develop the
underlying theory to the extent possible, 2) implement an ABM with behaviors to correspond
with the theoretical model, and 3) quantify the dierences between theoretical and ABM
outcomes.

Developing the theoretical model may require making simplifying assumptions or imposing implied constraints on the problem space, and it is important to make note of these.
Unless the modeler implements the behavior directly, an ABM will not observe assumptions
like non-negative production or the law of demand. Some solutions to the theoretical model
may have to be completed numerically, as is the case in this dissertation.

The range of

the parameter space for the numerical solutions is another assumption about the theoretical
model. Baseline correspondence between theory and the ABM can be established only for
an ABM that implements the assumptions of the theoretical model. The baseline correspondence is necessary to evaluate the performance of the ABM outside of the initial parameter
range, if that is a goal of the research.

There are no formal denitions for the development of ABMs like the theory of computability in mathematics and computer science (Turing, 1936). Some authors present guidelines on building ABMs (Arthur, 1993, 2006, Axelrod, 2006, 1997a, Epstein, 2006, Axelrod
and Tesfatsion, 2006). The baseline ABM is one that is intended to produce the same results as the theoretical model. If the theory is sound and the ABM represents the behaviors
that are appropriate for the theoretical model, Monte Carlo sampling the simulation results
provides a distribution how the ABM deviates from theory.

Monte Carlo sampling is a common means for collecting simulation data from an ABM
(Cook and Skinner, 2005). Hutchins (2010) adopts a hypothesis testing approach to compare
the distribution of ABM simulations with a theoretical model. This approach emphasizes the
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backwards-induction nature of validating and verifying computer models and simulations.
For the ABMs that are extensions of the baseline, condence estimates can be bootstrapped
from the characteristics of the t to theory in the baseline model.

The application of rigorous statistical and analytical techniques is out of the scope of this
dissertation. In order to focus on the process, the assessments of the accuracy and precision
of the ABM simulations are primarily qualitative with occasional quantitative points of
reference. An application of this approach to a real-world production technology with a real
demand function and actual parameters would certainly merit more exhaustive analysis.

8.2.2 Validating the basic Hotelling ABM
The measures used to validate the basic Hotelling ABM are primarily qualitative, as discussed in the preceding section. This is consistent with the highly stylized demand function
and production technologies. The preceding two sentences must be associated as a caveat
with any statement in this dissertation about the validation of the models. In this sense the
process represents qualitative validation.

It is important to recall that, although the goal is to reproduce Hotelling's Rule outcomes
using the ABM, Hotelling's Rule is not encoded in the model. The ABM is simply a producer
making estimates of total prot based on simple changes to the production path.

In the

following paragraphs, the term accuracy is used as a measure of the extent to which the
behavioral model in the ABM reproduces the outcomes predicted by the mathematical model
from Hotelling's Rule. There is no a priori means to estimate this accuracy quantitatively.
Qualitatively, Hotelling's Rule is purported to be the outcome for just such a producer, so
some similarity in the outcomes is expected.

The basic monopoly ABM reproducers the Hotelling theoretical outcome for the demand
function and parameters in Section 3.2 with an accuracy within 0.84±0.011 percent (see
Section 5.2.2). This is not a statistically rigorous measure of the error, but given the stylized
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nature of the mode, there is no reason to believe the error is signicantly greater. With the
all the aforementioned caveats, this ABM is validated for this application.

The other models in this dissertation are presented as illustrations of the kinds of errors
that can be associated with ABMs and the extent to which they reect errors made by real
people.

Qualitatively, however, errors in the xed cost model appear to be on the order

of the errors in the base model.

The marginal cost and stock cost models, however, are

candidates for the addition of more sophisticated rules. Both the marginal cost and stock
cost models exhibit error due to the size of changes in production.

This is a simulation

artifact and is illustrated in Section 1.2 and discussed for the respective models in Sections
6.5.2 and 6.5.3. Both models would likely benet from ner granularity in the production
level choices. Additionally, the stock cost model could be improved with a simple trial-anderror rule to maintain positive prot as stock costs increase.

The Hotelling ABMs are assessed in terms of the eectiveness of specic stylized scal
regimes in Chapter 7. This is an example of using agent-based modeling to explore unintended consequences.

These outcomes cannot be generalized beyond the stylized demand

function and scal regimes, although the results are qualitatively consistent with theory.

8.2.3 Exploring emergence
Emergent properties are essentially unexpected behaviors.

The classic example is the

model of a ock of birds. The individual agents - birds in this case - are given a simple rule:
stay close to your neighbors but not too close.

For some values of closeness, the motion

takes on the appearance of a ock of geese. For other values of closeness, the motion looks
like swarming insects. In either case, the group behavior is an emergent property, because
it wasn't programed in the model or the simulation.

Section 6.3 presents an oligopoly extension of the base Hotelling ABM model in which
there are emergent outcomes. For some distributions of initial stock, the market behaves as

Chapter 8.

Conclusions and Future Directions

though the agents were colluding.

140

For other distributions of the initial stock, the market

behaves as though the agents have reached a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. For either case the
model is identical and it has no way for one agent to know what any other agent is doing
other than the aggregate eect on price.
Emergent outcomes are not uncommon in even very basic ABMs, but there is an element
of serendipity to their discovery. This particular discovery suggests a more exhaustive investigation of the behaviors and a search for real-world counterparts. This, and other ideas,
are presented in the next section.

8.3 Future directions
A few ideas for future work have already arisen in this chapter. It is the intent that this
be the rst of many steps in establishing the utility and validity of agent-based modeling in
natural resource economics. In terms of the validation framework, there is much to be done
in terms of formalizing the procedures. This should include the addition of formal tests like
the hypothesis testing done by Hutchins (2010).
Some natural extensions of the Hotelling ABM include incorporating real-world demand
functions and production functions, real costs and taxes composed from multiple regimes,
renewable backstop technologies, overt competitive behaviors, cat-and-mouse games with
regulators, and so on. Much of this is achievable with little or no modication to the MASON
program developed for this project and available online at http://www.unm.edu/~ddixon .
As is often the case with ABMs, the eort to analyze these results is likely orders of magnitude
greater than the eort to create the models.
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Appendix A
GAUSS procedure to solve for

qmax

the marginal cost model

#i n c l u d e

inthp . sdf

#i n c l u d e

qnewtonmt . s d f

library

pgraph ;

/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ QNewton
∗
∗ Returns the f i t n e s s o f the
∗ the current values of
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗ T h i s f i n d s t h e v a l u e o f Tmax t h a t
∗ makes t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n e q u a l t o x0 .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
proc

QNewton ( s t r u c t

local
//

get

Qvar ,

mc ,

K,

PV Qparam ,
leftSide ,

struct

rightSide ,

the Q parameter

Qvar = pvUnpack ( Qparam , "Q " ) ;
//

put

it

into

the

data

object

qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ]
//

get

the

DS qNewtonData ) ;

= Qvar ;

parameter ( s )

mc = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
K = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;

qDelta ;

in
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//

compute

leftSide

the

the

and

ride
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sides

= e x p (−K∗ Qvar ) ;

−

rightSide = 1
//

left

qmax

fitness

qDelta =

mc
is

( Qvar <= 0

//

steer

it

Qvar ;

the

−

leftSide

if

∗

difference

and mc <

away

squared

rightSide ;

from

5);
zero

qDelta = 100;
endif ;
retp ( qDelta ^2);
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ QmaxFuncC
∗
∗ R e t u r n s t h e maximum p r o d u c t i o n
∗ l e v e l f o r a given marginal cost
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗ Computes
∗
∗ Qmax = maximum p r o d u c t i o n l e v e l
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QmaxFuncC ( s t r u c t DS ∗ qFuncData ,
external

struct

PV Qparam ;

external

struct

QNewtonmtControl

external

struct

QNewtonmtOut QmaxOpt ;

local
//

p u t mc

into

the

data

solve

for

= mc ;

o p t i m a l Qmax

QmaxOpt = QNewtonmt(&QNewton ,
//

qnewtControl ;

Qmax ;

qFuncData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ]
//

mc ) ;

p u t Tmax

into

the

Qparam ,

data

Qmax = pvUnpack ( QmaxOpt . p a r , "Q " ) ;
r e t p ( mc~Qmax ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗ DECLARE STRUCTURES
struct

DS qData ;

struct

DS

∗ pqData ;

∗/

∗ qFuncData ,

qnewtControl ) ;
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PV Qparam ;

struct

QNewtonmtControl

struct

QNewtonmtOut QmaxOpt ;

/ ∗ ASSIGN VALUES
mc = 1 ;
K = 5;

//
//

base

qnewtControl ;

∗/
value

constant

r = 1.1^(1/365.25)
Qmax = 1 0 0 . 0 ;

//

−1;

//

constant

starting

value

/ ∗ CREATE CONTROL STRUCTURES

∗/

q n e w t C o n t r o l = QNewtonmtControlCreate ;
Qparam = p v C r e a t e ;
Qparam = pvPack ( Qparam , Qmax, "Q " ) ;
pqData = &qData ;
qData . d a t a M a t r i x = mc

|

Qmax

qnewtControl . output = 1 ;

/∗

|

K

|

print

print

"mc = "

print

"Qmax = "

print

"K = "

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;

print

"r = "

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;

//

a

vector

of

unit

//

of

cost

values

from

0

to

profit

solutions

for

each

n(1 ,50 ,1);

Qmax = 1 0 0 . 0 ;
piV = piV

|

//

starting

value

QmaxFuncC ( pqData ,

c[n]);

endfor ;
print

piV ;

outfile
let

= " unitqmax " ;

varnames = u n i t _ c o s t

s u c c e s s = saved

5.0

50);

piV = { } ;
for

∗/

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;

0.1 ,

vector

results

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;

c = seqa (0 ,
a

r;

( piV ,

q_max ;

outfile ,

varnames ) ;

value

of

the

unit

cost
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Appendix B
GAUSS procedure for numerical
solutions to marginal cost model

#i n c l u d e

inthp . sdf

#i n c l u d e

qnewtonmt . s d f

library

pgraph ;

/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ QOpt
∗
∗ Returns the o p t i m a l p r o d u c t i o n path
∗ at time t given the v a l u e s o f
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ Tmax = t e r m i n a l t i m e o f p r o d u c t i o n
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QOpt ( s t r u c t DS ∗ qOptData , t ) ;
local

mc , Tmax , K, r ;

mc = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
Tmax = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
K = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
r e t p ( 1 /K∗ ( l n (K)

−

l n ( (K

−

mc ) ∗ e x p (− r

endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗
∗

QTotal

∗ (Tmax −

t ) ) + mc ) ) ) ;
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∗ Returns the t o t a l production over
∗ t h e p e r i o d ( 0 , Tmax ) g i v e n t h e v a l u e s
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ Tmax = t e r m i n a l t i m e o f p r o d u c t i o n
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗ T h i s i s u s e d t o s o l v e f o r Tmax
∗ by f i n d i n g t h e Tmax t h a t makes
∗ t o t a l production equal to t o t a l
∗ stock .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QTotal ( s t r u c t DS ∗ q T o t a l D a t a ) ;
local

of

Tmax , l i m , qTot ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

Tmax = q T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
if

( Tmax <=

0);

retp ( 0 ) ;
endif ;
l i m = Tmax

|

0;

qTot = i n t h p 4 (&QOpt ,

qTotalData ,

intControl ,

lim ) ;

r e t p ( qTot ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ QNewton
∗
∗ Returns the f i t n e s s o f the
∗ the current values of
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗ x0 = t o t a l s t o c k
∗
∗ T h i s f i n d s t h e v a l u e o f Tmax t h a t
∗ makes t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n e q u a l t o x0 .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
proc

QNewton ( s t r u c t

local
//

get

Tmax ,

x0 ,

PV Tparam ,

qTot ,

qDelta ;

the T parameter

Tmax = pvUnpack ( Tparam , " T " ) ;

struct

DS qNewtonData ) ;
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//

put

it

into

the

data

object

qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ]
//

get

the

x0

= Tmax ;

parameter

x0 = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 5 ] ;
//

compute

total

prodution

given

these

parameters

qTot = QTotal (&qNewtonData ) ;
//

the

fitness

−

q D e l t a = x0

is

the

difference

squared

qTot ;

retp ( qDelta ^2);
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ PiQ
∗
∗ Returns the p r o f i t at time t
∗ given the current values of
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c PiQ ( s t r u c t DS ∗ piQData , t ) ;
local

mc ,

K,

r ,

q,

piQ ;

mc = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
K = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
q = QOpt ( piQData ,
piQ = ( 1

−

e x p (−K

t );

∗

q)

−

mc

∗

q ) ∗ e x p (− r

r e t p ( piQ ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ PiTotal
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l p r o f i t given
∗ the current values of
∗
∗ mc = m a r g i n a l c o s t
∗ Tmax = t e r m i n a l t i m e o f p r o d u c t i o n
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /

∗

t );
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proc

PiTotal ( s t r u c t

local

DS

∗ piTotalData ) ;

Tmax , l i m ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

Tmax = p i T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
l i m = Tmax
if

|

( Tmax <=

0;
0);

retp ( 0 ) ;
endif ;
r e t p ( i n t h p 4 (&PiQ ,

piTotalData ,

intControl ,

lim ) ) ;

endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ PiFuncC
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l optimized
∗ p r o f i t a s a f u n c i t o n o f mc ,
∗ given the values of
∗
∗ K = choke p r i c e
∗ r = daily interest rate
∗ x0 = t o t a l s t o c k
∗
∗ Computes
∗
∗ Tmax = t e r m i n a l t i m e o f p r o d u c t i o n
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c PiFuncC ( s t r u c t DS ∗ p i Fu n c Da t a , mc ) ;
external

struct

PV Tparam ;

external

struct

QNewtonmtControl

external

struct

QNewtonmtOut TmaxOpt ;

local
//

Tmax , p i T o t ;

p u t mc

into

the

data

p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ]
//

solve

for

optimal

= mc ;

Tmax

TmaxOpt = QNewtonmt(&QNewton ,
//

qnewtControl ;

p u t Tmax

into

the

Tparam ,

∗ p i Fu n c Da t a ,

data

Tmax = pvUnpack ( TmaxOpt . p a r , " T " ) ;
p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ]
//

comput

total

profit

= Tmax ;

based

piTot = P i T o t a l ( piFuncData ) ;
r e t p ( mc~Tmax~P i T o t ) ;
endp ;

on mc and Tmax

qnewtControl ) ;
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/ ∗ DECLARE STRUCTURES

∗/

struct

DS qData ;

struct

DS

struct

PV Tparam ;

struct

inthpControl

struct

QNewtonmtControl

struct

QNewtonmtOut TMaxOpt ;

∗ pqData ;

/ ∗ ASSIGN VALUES
mc = 1 ;

//

base

//

value
//

starting

value

constant

r = 1.1^(1/365.25)
x0 = 1 0 0 ;

qnewtControl ;

∗/

Tmax = 2 2 3 5 . 2 5 5 ;
K = 5;

intControl ;

//

−1;

//

constant

constant

/ ∗ CREATE CONTROL STRUCTURES

∗/

intControl = inthpControlCreate ;
q n e w t C o n t r o l = QNewtonmtControlCreate ;
Tparam = p v C r e a t e ;
Tparam = pvPack ( Tparam , Tmax , " T " ) ;
pqData = &qData ;
qData . d a t a M a t r i x = mc
//

|

Tmax

qnewtControl . output = 1 ;

|

K

/∗

|

print

" PiZero = "

print

"mc = "

print

"Tmax = "

print

"K = "

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;

print

"r = "

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;

print

" x0 = "

print

" QTotal = "

//

a

vector

of

PiFuncC ( pqData ,

x0 ;

results

∗/

0);

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 5 ] ;
QTotal ( pqData ) ;

unit

c = seqa (0 ,

0.04 ,
of

vector

|

qData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;

//

a

r

print

cost

values

from

0

to

5.0

50);

profit

solutions

for

each

value

of

the

unit

cost

piV = { } ;
for

n(1 ,50 ,1);

piV = piV

|

PiFuncC ( pqData ,

c [n]);

endfor ;
//

outfile

= " unitnumerical3 ";

//

let

//

s u c c e s s = saved

( piV ,

//

regress

a

varnames = u n i t _ c o s t
Tmax a s

t_max

outfile ,

function

of

pi_total ;
varnames ) ;
cost

and

cost

squared

( because

the

residuals

_olsres = 1;
{ nam , m, b , s t b , vc , s t d , s i g , cx , r s q , r e s i d , dbw } =
print

resid ;

o l s ( " " , piV [ . , 2 ] , piV [ . , 1 ] ~ piV [ . , 1
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GAUSS procedure for numerical
solutions to the stock cost model

#i n c l u d e

inthp . sdf

#i n c l u d e

qnewtonmt . s d f

library

pgraph ;

/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ QOpt
∗
∗ Returns the o p t i m a l p r o d u c t i o n path
∗ at time t given the v a l u e s o f
∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QOpt ( s t r u c t DS ∗ qOptData , t ) ;
local

s c , Tmax , K, r , mT, d e l t a T , e r t , m, q ;

s c = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
Tmax = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
K = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
mT = qOptData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 7 ] ;
d e l t a T = Tmax

−

t;

q = 0;
if

0 == s c ;

q = r /K∗ d e l t a T ;
else ;
e r t = e x p (− r
m = sc

/

q = 1

/ K

endif ;

∗

r

∗

∗
(1

deltaT ) ;

−

e r t ) + mT

l n ( K / m) ;

∗

ert ;
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retp (q ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ QTotal
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l production over
∗ t h e p e r i o d ( 0 , Tmax ) g i v e n t h e
∗ current values of the parameters
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QTotal ( s t r u c t DS ∗ q T o t a l D a t a ) ;
local

Tmax , l i m , qTot ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

Tmax = q T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
l i m = Tmax

|

0;

qTot = i n t h p 4 (&QOpt ,

qTotalData ,

intControl ,

lim ) ;

r e t p ( qTot ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ QCurrent
∗
∗ Returns the c u r r e n t t o t a l production over
∗ the period (0 , t ) given the current values
∗ of the parameters
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c QCurrent ( s t r u c t DS ∗ q T o t a l D a t a ) ;
local

Tmax , l i m , qTot , t ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

t = q T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 6 ] ;
qTot = 0 ;
if

(0 < t ) ;

lim = t

|

0;

qTot = i n t h p 4 (&QOpt ,

qTotalData ,

intControl ,

endif ;
r e t p ( qTot ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗

QNewtonT
This

finds

difference
and
of

x0−xT
the

the

square

between
given

the

parameters .

of

total

the
production

current

values

lim ) ;
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∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
proc

QNewtonT ( s t r u c t

local
//

Tmax ,

get

sc ,

K,

PV Tparam ,

x0 ,

mT,

dx ,

struct
xT ,

DS qNewtonData ) ;

qTot ,

qDelta ;

the T parameter

Tmax = pvUnpack ( Tparam , " T " ) ;
//

put

it

into

the

data

object

qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ]
//

get

the

= Tmax ;

parameters

x0 = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 5 ] ;
xT = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 8 ] ;
//

compute

total

prodution

given

these

parameters

qTot = 0 ;
if

( 0 < Tmax ) ;

qTot = QTotal (&qNewtonData ) ;
endif ;
//

the

fitness

q D e l t a = ( x0

is

−

xT

the

−

difference

squared

qTot ) / x0 ;

retp ( qDelta ^2);
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ QNewtonQT
∗
∗ Returns the square o f the d i f f e r e n c e
∗ between
∗
∗ e x p (−K∗qT )
∗
∗ and
∗
∗ s c / K ∗ qT
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
proc

QNewtonQT ( s t r u c t

local
//

get

qT ,

sc ,

K,

r ,

PV Qparam ,

ekt ,

linQ ,

struct

qDelta ,

DS qNewtonData ) ;
x0 ;

the Q parameter

qT = pvUnpack ( Qparam , "QT" ) ;
//

get

the

parameters

s c = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
K = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
x0 = qNewtonData . d a t a M a t r i x [ 5 ] ;
//

compute

the

e k t = e x p (−K

∗

exponential
qT ) ;

and

linear

terms
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−

linQ = (1
if

∗

sc

x0 )

/

∗qT ) ;

(1 + K

( abs ( ekt ) < abs ( linQ ) ) ;

qDelta = ( linQ

−

ekt )/ ekt ;

else ;

−

qDelta = ( ekt

linQ )/ linQ ;

endif ;
//

the

fitness

is

the

difference

squared

retp ( qDelta ^2);
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ PiX
∗
∗ Returns the p r e s e n t value o f
∗ the p r o f i t at time t given
∗ the current values of the
∗ parameters .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c PiX ( s t r u c t DS ∗ piQData , t ) ;
local

sc ,

external

K,

r ,

struct

mT,

q,

qCumulative ,

inthpControl

piX ;

intControl ;

s c = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;
K = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
mT = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 7 ] ;
piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 6 ]
q = QOpt ( piQData ,

= t;

//

pass

q C u m u l a t i v e = QCurrent ( piQData ) ;
piX = ( 1

−

e x p (−K

the

current

∗

q)

−

sc

∗

//

this

is

endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ CostX
∗
∗ Returns the p r e s e n t value o f
∗ the c o s t at time t given
∗ the current values of the
∗ parameters .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c CostX ( s t r u c t DS ∗ piQData , t ) ;
local

sc ,

K,

r ,

struct

mT,

q,

qCumulative ,

inthpControl

s c = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ] ;

the

same

q C u m u l a t i v e ) ∗ e x p (− r

r e t p ( piX ) ;

external

time

to

QCurrent

as

x0

t );

costX ;

intControl ;

∗

t );

−

x
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K = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
mT = piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 7 ] ;
piQData−>d a t a M a t r i x [ 6 ]
q = QOpt ( piQData ,

= t;

//

pass

q C u m u l a t i v e = QCurrent ( piQData ) ;
costX = s c

∗

the

current

time

to

QCurrent

same

as

x0

t );

qCumulative

∗

//

e x p (− r

∗

this

is

the

t );

r e t p ( costX ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ PiTotal
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l p r o f i t given
∗ the current values of the
∗ parameters .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c P i T o t a l ( s t r u c t DS ∗ p i T o t a l D a t a ) ;
local

Tmax , l i m , p i T o t ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

Tmax = p i T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
piTot = 0 ;
if

( 0 < Tmax ) ;

l i m = Tmax

|

0;

p i T o t = i n t h p 4 (&PiX ,

piTotalData ,

intControl ,

lim ) ;

endif ;
r e t p ( piTot ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗

∗ TotalCost
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l c o s t given
∗ the current values of the
∗ parameters .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c T o t C o s t ( s t r u c t DS ∗ c o s t T o t a l D a t a ) ;
local

Tmax , l i m , t o t C o s t ;

external

struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

Tmax = c o s t T o t a l D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ] ;
totCost = 0;
if

( 0 < Tmax ) ;

l i m = Tmax

|

0;

t o t C o s t = i n t h p 4 (&CostX ,

costTotalData ,

intControl ,

lim ) ;

−

x
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endif ;
retp ( totCost ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ PiFuncC
∗
∗ Returns the t o t a l optimized
∗ p r o f i t a s a f u n c i t o n o f mc ,
∗ given the current values of
∗ the parameters .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
p r o c PiFuncC ( s t r u c t DS ∗ p i Fu n c Da t a ,

sc ) ;

external

struct

PV QTparam ;

external

struct

QNewtonmtControl

external

struct

QNewtonmtOut TmaxOpt ;

external

struct

QNewtonmtOut QTmaxOpt ;

local

qT ,

struct

K,

mT,

Tmax ,

piTot ,

qnewtControl ;

dx ,

x0 ,

xT ,

r ,

eKT ;

PV Tparam ;

Tparam = p v C r e a t e ;
//

the

newton

//

the

starting

//

at

if

( 0 == s c ) ;

//

the

an

solver

estimate

right

is

value ,
for

answer

especially
so

this

is

sensitive
a

rough

to

hack

Tmax

is

1957

Tparam = pvPack ( Tparam , 2 0 0 0 , "T " ) ;
else ;
//

this

//

problematic

is

//

to

the

based

solely

unless

actual

on

the

value

the

fact

starting

that

sc = 0.0035

estimate

is

is

close

(638)

Tparam = pvPack ( Tparam , 2 / s c , " T " ) ;
endif ;
//

put

sc

into

the

data

p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 1 ]

= sc ;

K = pi F u nc D a ta −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 3 ] ;
r = pi F u nc D a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 4 ] ;
x0 = p iF u n cD a t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 5 ] ;
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
//

First ,

figure

//
if

( 0 == s c ) ;

qT = 0 ;

out

qT ,

which

requires

numerical

fitting

if

xT

is

going

to

b
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//

c a l c u l a t e mT

∗

mT = K
//

e x p (−K

calculate

∗

qT ) ;

xT

xT = 0 ;
elseif
//

( s c < 1/ x0 ) ;

solve

for

optimal

qT

QTmaxOpt = QNewtonmt(&QNewtonQT ,

QTparam ,

∗ p i Fu n c Da t a ,

qnewtControl ) ;

qT = pvUnpack ( QTmaxOpt . p a r , "QT" ) ;
//

c a l c u l a t e mT

eKT = e x p (−K

∗

mT = K
//

∗

qT ) ;

eKT ;

calculate

xT

xT = 0 ;
else ;
qT = 1 0 0 ;
//

c a l c u l a t e mT

mT = 0 ;
//

calculate

−

xT = x0

1

xT
/

sc ;

endif ;
//

put

it

in

the

structure

p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 7 ]

= mT;

p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 8 ]

= xT ;

p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 9 ]

= qT ;

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
//

Second ,

find

t h e Tmax

that

uses

up

the

stock

( down

to

xT

if

its

//
//

solve

for

optimal

Tmax

TmaxOpt = QNewtonmt(&QNewtonT ,
//

p u t Tmax

into

the

Tparam ,

∗ p i Fu n c Da t a ,

data

Tmax = pvUnpack ( TmaxOpt . p a r , " T " ) ;
p i Fu n c Da t a −>d a t a M a t r i x [ 2 ]
//

compute

total

profit

= Tmax ;

based

piTot = P i T o t a l ( piFuncData ) ;
r e t p ( s c ~qT~mT~Tmax~xT~P i T o t ) ;
endp ;
/ ∗ DECLARE STRUCTURES
struct

DS qData ;

∗ pqData ;

struct

DS

struct

PV Tparam ;

struct

PV QTparam ;

∗/

on

sc

and Tmax

qnewtControl ) ;

nonzero )
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struct

inthpControl

intControl ;

struct

QNewtonmtControl

struct

QNewtonmtOut TMaxOpt ;

struct

QNewtonmtOut QTMaxOpt ;

/ ∗ ASSIGN VALUES

∗/

sc = 0.000026;

//

Tmax = 6 0 0 ;

starting

K = 5;

//

//

base

value
value

constant

r = 1.1^(1/365.25)
x0 = 1 0 0 ;

qnewtControl ;

//

−1;

//

constant

constant

t = 1;
mT =

0.01;

qT =

0.01;

xT = 0 ;
/ ∗ CREATE CONTROL STRUCTURES

∗/

intControl = inthpControlCreate ;
q n e w t C o n t r o l = QNewtonmtControlCreate ;
Tparam = p v C r e a t e ;
Tparam = pvPack ( Tparam , Tmax , " T " ) ;
QTparam = p v C r e a t e ;
QTparam = pvPack ( QTparam , qT , "QT" ) ;
pqData = &qData ;
qData . d a t a M a t r i x = s c

|

Tmax

//

qnewtControl . output = 1 ;

//

a

vector

c = seqa (0 ,
print
//

a

of

stock

0.0005 ,

cost

|

K

/∗

|

r

|

print

values

up

x0

|

results
to

t

| mT |

xT

|

qT ;

∗/

.05

100);

" s c \ tqT \tmT\tTmax\ txT \ t P i T o t " ;
vector

of

profit

solutions

for

each

value

of

the

stock

cost

piV = { } ;
for

n(1 ,100 ,1);

p i S e t = PiFuncC ( pqData ,

c[n]);

t C o s t = T o t C o s t ( pqData ) ;
piV = piV

|

p i S e t ~tCost ;

endfor ;
print

piV ;

outfile
let

= " stocknumerical2 ";

varnames = s t o c k _ c o s t

s u c c e s s = saved
//

regress

( piV ,

Tmax a s

a

q_t m_t t_max x_t

outfile ,
function

pi_total

cost_total ;

varnames ) ;
of

cost

and

cost

squared

//

_olsres = 1;

//

{ nam , m, b , s t b , vc , s t d , s i g , cx , r s q , r e s i d , dbw } =

( because

the

residuals

o l s ( " " , piV [ . , 2 ] , piV [ . , 1 ] ) ;
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Appendix D

The MASON Hotelling package

MASON

1

is a Java software library to support discrete-event multiagent simulation. The

MASON software distribution includes a collection of sample applications presented in the
Console application, shown in Figure D.2.

The panel on the left lists the sample ABMs

provided in MASON. The panel on the right shows the title display for the Hotelling's Rule
Model application created for this project.

Figure D.1: Hotelling's Rule Model in the MASON

1 http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/

Appendix D. The MASON Hotelling package

168

When the Hotelling's Rule Model application is selected, the control panel is displayed
in Figure D.2. Below the control panel is the market display, which allows the user to view
statistics for specic rms.

To the right of the control panel are plot panels displaying

the dynamical variables in the simulation. The control panel allows the user to select the
number of rms and the market model (monopoly, oligopoly, etc.) The simulation is started
by clicking the triangular button at the bottom of the control panel.

Figure D.2: Hotelling's Rule Model control panel.

Figure D.3 shows the display after selecting an oligopoly market of ve rms with shared
stock. In the market display, the red dot represents the market and the white dots represent
each of the rms, numbered from zero going clockwise from the top. By clicking on the red
dot, the user can see current market statistics, such as current market price. By clicking on
a white dot, the user can see current rm statistics, such as production level, stock level,
costs, etc. Figure D.4 shows a running simulation.
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Figure D.3: An oligopoly market with ve rms.
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Appendix D. The MASON Hotelling package

Figure D.4: A running simulation.
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